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Introduction
Hardware and software technologies are progressing fast, dramatically increasing the com-
plexity of modern computer systems. Large scale and distributed infrastructures are being
increasingly employed, even in the context of critical scenarios; programs are being devel-
oped according to modular software architectures, typically based on Oﬀ-The-Shelf (OTS)
software items. These allow industries to be competitive by reducing the development costs
and the time to market.
Over the last decade, computers are enabling crucial human everyday activities, such as
public economy, large scale critical infrastructures management (e.g., for water and power
supply plants and energy production), and air traﬃc control. Given the growing depen-
dence on computers in these life- and cost-critical applications, dependability becomes an
essential demand: a failure, indeed, can be catastrophic in terms of business or, even worse,
human losses.
Business critical systems, e.g., for e-commerce or e-government applications, have to maxi-
mize system availability and service reliability in order to maximize customers’ satisfaction
and survive today’s competition. Since these systems are widely distributed to users with
diﬀerent and unknown usage patterns, developing dependability strategies becomes quite
complicated. This holds also for everyday critical systems, e.g., hospitals or banks, which
rely on databases management systems whose failures would deeply aﬀect individuals or
groups.
1
2Conversely, mission and safety critical systems have a narrow set of target users, and usage
patterns are predictable in many cases. For these systems, the dependability level is regu-
lated by standard speciﬁcations, carried out by international bodies, to which commercial
products have to be compliant (e.g., the DO-178B standard for avionics software certiﬁca-
tion 1).
For these reasons, a great research eﬀort is being devoted to the dependability evaluation,
assessment and improvement of complex software. In particular, testing and veriﬁcation
activities, along with fault tolerance techniques are massively used to satisfy dependability
requirements.
The key for achieving fault tolerance is the ability to accurately detect, diagnose,
and recover from faults during system operation. The great research eﬀort striven
in fault tolerant systems has provided good results with respect to hardware-related errors
and faults. In most of the cases, these are easy to reproduce and repair, e.g., stuck-at or
bit ﬂips. Recent and eminent references addressing these issues are [2], [3], [4].
Conversely, software faults, which have been demonstrated to be the major cause of sys-
tems [5], [6], are neither easy to characterize nor to recover, hence they represent the major
matter of concern for complex systems dependability.
A plenty of studies, from the dependability and software engineering communities, demon-
strated that the manifestation of a software fault, i.e., a software error, can be
permanent as well as transient. According to this, software faults have been classiﬁed
in Bohrbugs, which result in permanent errors, and Heisenbugs which instead manifest tran-
siently. While the former can be discovered successfully by means of traditional testing and
static analysis techniques, the latter elude the testing process and cannot be reproduced
systematically [7]. Studies on ﬁeld data analysis showed that most of software faults fall
within Heisenbugs, in that they are due to overloads, timing and exception errors or race
conditions, i.e., to environmental factors which can vary over time [8, 9]. The problem is
1http://www.lynuxworks.com/solutions/milaero/do-178b.php3
3exacerbated by the presence of OTS components whose well-known dependability pitfalls
do not hold industries back from their usage in critical systems. In fact, their dependability
behavior is unknown or diﬃcult to characterize in that they can behave unpredictably when
used out of the so-called intended proﬁle, and when integrated with other components.
Faults propagation is indeed exacerbated by integration: a fault can propagate in several
ways and among several components, thus complicating the task of fault location. However,
the identiﬁcation of a fault could not suﬃce for dependability improvement: the bug could
not be ﬁxed due to the closed source nature of many OTS items. This results in the lack of
an exhaustive failure modes characterization of the overall system at design/development
time, thus making traditional dependability means (e.g., fault prevention, fault tolerance
or fault removal during development) unsuitable for dealing with software faults.
Diagnosis seems to be a promising alternative to traditional means, mainly for
what fault location may concern. Several vocabulary deﬁnitions answer the question of
what is diagnosis. From the ancient Greek διαγιγωσκ	ιν, which stands for to discern, to
distinguish, they share the general meaning of identifying the nature and cause of some phe-
nomenon. In the ﬁeld of dependable systems, diagnosis aims to identify the root cause of
a failure, i.e., the fault, starting from its outward symptoms.Existing diagnosis approaches,
which mainly cope with hardware-induced errors and their symptoms within a software
system, have to be revised in order to deal with software faults and their transient man-
ifestations. With respect to hardware faults, these have to be discriminated in that they
could induce unnecessary and costly recovery actions thus reducing available resources and
aﬀecting the reliability level of the overall system [2]. Software faults, instead, have to be
properly taken into account since they could be catastrophic, and ad-hoc recovery actions
have to be initiated when they occur. However, the problem of recovery costs still holds
andit has to be faced by deﬁning ad-hoc and ﬁne grained recovery strategies.
Hence, a novel and recovery-oriented approach is needed in charge of diagnosing software
faults and of coping with their transient manifestations.
4Several challenges have to be faced when designing this approach. First, the presence of
software faults hampers the deﬁnition of a simple, and accurate, mathematical model able
to describe systems failure modes (hence, pure model based techniques become inadequate).
Second, due to the presence of OTS components, low intrusiveness in terms of source code
modiﬁcations is desirable. Third, diagnosis has to be performed on-line and automatically,
i.e., a fault has to be located as soon as possible during system execution and with lack of
human guidance. The reason for this is twofold. On the one hand, it is to fulﬁll strict time
requirements, for system recovery and reconﬁguration, in the case of a fault. On the other
hand, it is to face system complexity with respect to ordinary system management and
maintainance operations, whose manual execution would result in strenuous human eﬀorts
and long completion times.
Thesis Contributions
The eﬀorts striven in this dissertation result into the design and implementation of a novel,
holistic, approach for on-line Software Faults Diagnosis in complex and OTS based critical
systems.
Detection (D), Location (L) and Recovery (R) have been integrated into the diagnosis pro-
cess, leading to the design of a complex DLR framework. An integrated approach has not
been proposed so far to perform diagnosis of software faults in complex and OTS based
systems.
The intuition of combining fault detection and location has been desribed in some works
addressing system level diagnosis [10, 11] to face the problem of transient manifestations,
i.e., to manage the partial knowledge about the failure modes of the target system.
As for recovery, two points are worth noting. First, combining recovery actions with diagno-
sis allows the system to diagnose and recover from faults that would not be discoverable by
using system diagnosis only, as stated in [12, 13]. Second, a recovery oriented approach is
the key for achieving fault tolerance in that it allows to trigger actions which are tailored for
5the particular fault that occurred. The strong advantage of the proposed approach is that
information related to the nature of the occurred faults are also provided when recovery is
performed, which are useful (i) for alerting human operators if the fault is unknown and
cannot be located and (ii) for oﬀ-line periodic maintainance of the target system.
The driving idea behind the overall approach is based on the machine learning paradigm,
and dependencies exist among the three phases, which hold in the form of feedback actions.
These are mainly aimed to improve detection quality over time, by reducing the number of
false positives, and can be performed both manually or automatically. However, the whole
process of diagnosis is designed to be performed on-line, i.e., to diagnose faults and to re-
cover the system during its operational phase, diﬀerently from most of the previous work
which proposed oﬀ-line/ on-site diagnosis approaches aiming to locate bugs in the source
code, and sometimes the environmental conditions.
The most important contributions of this thesis, which bring an added value to the existing
literature, are:
• The integration of detection, location and recovery into an integrated diagnosis pro-
cess;
• The exploitation of OS support to detect application failures, as well as to support
error detection in a location oriented perspective;
• The design of a location strategy in charge of managing unknown faults, i.e., the root
causes of ﬁeld failures which can manifest during system operational life;
• The application of the anomaly detection techniques to software faults diagnosis.
The DLR framework has been actually implemented in the form of a complex diagnosis
engine, designed to work under the Linux environment. Its eﬀectiveness has been evaluated
on a real world case study, in the ﬁeld of Air Traﬃc Control. Experiments show that the
engine has been able to locate known faults at a good quality and low overhead. Good
6results have also been achieved in terms of the location of unknown faults, as well as of the
reduction of false positives over time which was one of the most important requirements of
the proposed detection strategy.
Thesis organization
A thorough analysis of existing literature, corroborated by the experiments conducted in this
thesis, has highlighted the need for the DLR framework, i.e., of a holistic approach in charge
of combining detection, location and recovery into an integrated process. In particular,
this originates from the studies which have been conducted in this thesis focusing (i) on
the detection and its impact on diagnosis and (ii) the importance of a recovery oriented
approach for achieving fault tolerance in complex OTS based systems. In order to emphasize
the role that each phase plays in the context of the DLR framework, the thesis has been
organized following a top-down approach. It gives an overview of the overall framework,
and of the proposed approach as well, in chapter 2, where the need for such a holistic view is
justiﬁed by analyzing the related work. The following chapters have been devoted to discuss
each phase of the DLR framework. Chapter 3 focuses on detection, whereas location and
recovery are discussed in chapter 4. As the thesis is mainly based on experiments, aiming to
corroborate theoretical intuitions or to demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of proposed solutions,
their discussion is spread all over the work. Experimental results related to the detection
of kernel hangs and application failures are reported in chapter 3; DLR eﬀectiveness is
proved instead in chapter 5, where also a deep description of the case study is provided. To
summarize, the reminder of the thesis has been organized as follows:
• Chapter 1 provides the basic concepts of dependability and of software dependability
as well. Software faults, and the failure process are described thoroughly, emphasizing
the problem of transient manifestations. The ﬁnal part of the chapter is devoted to
fault injection and to the related literature focusing on it.
7• Chapter 2 describes the DLR framework and it gives an overview of the proposed
approach. Its ﬁnal part is devoted to the discussion of related work on fault diagnosis.
• Chapter 3 focuses of the problem of detection. It illustrates all the experimental
studies which have been conducted in aiming to demonstrate the importance of the
operating system support, as well as the impact of detection on the overall diagnosis
quality.
• Chapter 4 describes the location phase, and the recovery actions as well. A description
of the machine learning paradigm, and of the adopted classiﬁers is provided as well,
in order to facilitate the comprehension for readers which are not skilled in this ﬁeld.
• Chapter 5 is ﬁnally devoted to describe the case study and the experimental cam-
paigns, as well as to discuss the achieved results.
If you trust before you try, you may
repent before you die.
Nathan Bailey, 1721
Chapter 1
Software dependability
Dependability is a complex attribute whose deﬁnition changed several times in the last decade. In-
deed, the increasing complexity of systems has caused dependability to become a major concern,
encompassing several aspects, from safety to security. Focus is on software dependability into which
current research eﬀorts are striven to face the problem of transient manifestation of software faults.
In the ﬁrst part of the chapter, fundamentals of dependability are provided. Then the focus moves
to software dependability, devoting particular attention to the classiﬁcation of software faults and
the ways they can manifest. Last sections are devoted to fault injection, as it is currenty the most
eﬀective mean for dependability evaluation and assessment of complex software systems.
1.1 Software Dependability
Software is design, diﬀerently from any other engineering product. Its unreliability is only
due to design faults, i.e., to the consequences of human failures. Hardware reliability, in-
stead, is dominated by random physical factors aﬀecting the components on which there
is engineering knowledge enough to prevent failures. This is demonstrated by the several
reliability theories that have been developed so far for the realization of highly dependable
8
9hardware systems, as well as for hardware reliability evaluation and assessment.
Software is replacing older technologies in safety and mission critical applications (e.g., air
traﬃc engine control, raiload interlocking, nuclear plants management), and it is moving
from an auxiliary to a primary role in providing critical services (e.g., modern air traﬃc
systems are being designed to handle much more traﬃc than in the past few years). Addi-
tionally, it is being used to solve novel problems, i.e., problems for which there is a lack of
evidence from past history, as well as to perform diﬃcult tasks which would be not possible
otherwise (e.g., enhanced support to pilots in unstable aircrafts). If on the one hand this
provides great advantages and reduces human eﬀorts, on the other hand the more diﬃcult
the task, the greater the probability of mistakes which can even result in catastrophes, e.g.;
• July 28, 1962 - Mariner I space probe. A bug in the ﬂight control software
causes the Mariner I rocket to calculate the incorrect trajectory. The rocket was
destroyed by Mission Control over the Atlantic.
• 1982 - Soviet gas pipeline. A bug in the Soviet gas pipeline software controls
caused the largest non-nuclear, man-made explosion in history.
• 1985-1987- Therac-25 medical accelerator. A therapeutic device that utilizes
radiation has a bug which can lead to a race condition. If that condition occurs then
the patient receives multiple times the recommend dosage of radiation. The failure
directly caused the deaths of ﬁve patients and harmed many more.
• January 15, 1990 - AT&T Network Outage. A bug in a new release of code
causes the switches of AT&T to crash. Over 60 thousand New Yorkers were left
without phone service for nine hours.
• November 2000 – National Cancer Institute, Panama City. The software
of a therapeutic device that utilizes radiation for treatment delivers twice the recom-
mended dosage. Eight patients die and 20 more will undoubtedly be permanently
10
disabled.
• May 2004 Mercedes-Benz - “Sensotronic” braking system - Mercedes-Benz
has to recall 680,000 cars due to a failure of its Sensotronic breaking system.
1.2 Basic Concepts of Dependability
Even if the eﬀort on the deﬁnition of the basic concepts and terminology for computer
systems dependability dates back to 1980, the milestone paper in the ﬁeld of dependable
systems is [14], which was published in 1985. Here dependability was deﬁned as the quality
of the delivered service such that reliance can justiﬁably be placed on this service, but the
notion has evolved over the years. Recent eﬀorts from the same community deﬁne the
dependability as the ability to avoid service failures that are more frequent and more severe
than is acceptable [15]. This last deﬁnition has been introduced since it does not stress the
need for justiﬁcation of reliance.
The dependability is a composed quality attribute, that encompasses the following sub-
attributes:
• Availability: readiness for correct service;
• Reliability: continuity of correct service;
• Safety: absence of catastrophic consequences on the user(s) and the environment;
• Conﬁdentiality: absence of improper system alterations;
• Maintainability: ability to undergo modiﬁcations and repairs.
1.2.1 Threats
The causes that lead a system to deliver an incorrect service, i.e., a service deviating from
its function, are manifold and can manifest at any phase of its life-cycle. Hardware faults
11
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Figure 1.1: The propagation chain: fault, error, failure
and design errors are just an example of the possible sources of failure. These causes, along
with the manifestation of incorrect service, are recognized in the literature as dependability
threats, and are commonly categorized as failures, errors, and faults [15].
A failure is an event that occurs when the delivered service deviates from correct service. A
service fails either because it does not comply with the functional speciﬁcation, or because
this speciﬁcation did not adequately describe the system function. A service failure is a
transition from correct service to incorrect service, i.e., to not implementing the system
function. The period of delivery of incorrect service is a service outage. The transition
from incorrect service to correct service is a service recovery or repair. The deviation from
correct service may assume diﬀerent forms that are called service failure modes and are
ranked according to failure severities.
An error can be regarded as the part of a system’s total state that may lead to a failure.
In other words, a failure occurs when the error causes the delivered service to deviate from
the correct service. The adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error is called a fault. Faults
can be either internal or external of a system, and they can be classiﬁed in several ways
(e.g., basing on their nature, or the way they manifest in errors).
Failures, errors, and faults are related each other in the form of a chain of threats [15], as
sketched in ﬁgure 1.1. A fault is active when it produces an error; otherwise, it is dormant.
An active fault is either i) an internal fault that was previously dormant and that has been
activated, or ii) an external fault. A failure occurs when an error is propagated to the service
12
interface and causes the service delivered by the system to deviate from correct service. An
error which does not lead the system to failure is said to be a latent error. A failure of a
system component causes an internal fault of the system that contains such a component, or
causes an external fault for the other system(s) that receive service from the given system.
The dependability attributes can be formalized mathematically, and basic measures have
been introduced in charge of quantifying them.
The reliability, R(t), was the only dependability measure of interest to early designers of
dependable computer systems. It is the the conditional probability of delivering a correct
service in the interval [0, t], given that the service was correct at the reference time 0 [16]:
R(0 , t) = P(no failures in [0 , t ]|correct service in 0 ) (1.1)
Let us call F (t) the unreliability function, i.e., the cumulative distribution function of the
failure time. The reliability function can thus be written as:
R(t)=1-F(t) (1.2)
Since reliability is a function of the mission duration T , mean time to failure (MTTF) is
often used as a single numeric indicator of system reliability [17]. In particular, the time to
failure (TTF) of a system is deﬁned as the interval of time between a system recovery and
the consecutive failure.
As for availability, they say a system to be available at a the time t if it is able to provide a
correct service at that instant of time. The availability can thus be thought as the expected
value E(A(t)) of the following A(t) function:
A(t) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if proper service at t
0 otherwise
(1.3)
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In other terms, the availability is the fraction of time that the system is operational. The
measuring of the availability became important with the advent of time-sharing systems.
These systems brought with it an issue for the continuity of computer service and thus
minimizing the “down time” became a prime concern. Availability is a function not only
of how rarely a system fails but also of how soon it can be repaired upon failure. Clearly,
a synthetic availability indicator can be computed as:
Av =
MTTF
MTTF +MTTR
=
MTTF
MTBF
(1.4)
where MTBF = MTTF + MTTR is the mean time between failures. The time between
failures (TBF) is the time interval between two consecutive failures. Obviously, this measure
makes sense only for the so-called repairable systems.
R(t) and A(t) are the dependability attributes of major interest for this dissertation. A
complete dissertation about dependability fundamentals can be found in [15], along with a
description of dependability measures.
1.2.2 Means
Dependability means can be grouped into four major categories [15]:
• Fault prevention, to prevent the occurrence or introduction of faults. It is enforced
during the design phase of a system, both for software (e.g., information hiding,
modularization, use of strongly-typed programming languages) and hardware (e.g.,
design rules).
• Fault tolerance, to avoid service failures in the presence of faults. It takes place
during the operational life of the system. A widely used method of achieving fault
tolerance is redundancy, either temporal or spatial. Temporal redundancy attempts
to reestablish proper operation by bringing the system in a error-free state and by
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repeating the operation which caused the failure, while spatial redundancy exploits
the computation performed by multiple system’s replicas. The former is adequate for
transient faults, whereas the latter can be eﬀective only under the assumption that
the replicas are not aﬀected by the same permanent faults. This can be achieved
through design diversity [18].
Both temporal and spatial redundancy requires error detection and recovery tech-
niques to be in place: upon error detection (i.e., the ability to identify that an error
occurred in the system), a recovery action is performed.
The measure of eﬀectiveness of any given fault tolerance technique is called its cover-
age, i.e, the percentage of the total number of failures that are successfully recovered
by the fault tolerance mean.
• Fault removal, to reduce the number and severity of faults. The removal activity
is usually performed during the veriﬁcation and validation phases of the system de-
velopment, by means of testing and/or fault injection [19]. However, fault removal
can also be done during the operational phase, in terms of corrective and perfective
maintenance.
• Fault forecasting, to estimate the present number, the future incidence, and the
likely consequences of faults. Fault forecasting is conducted by evaluating the system
behavior with respect to fault occurrence or activation. Evaluation cna be (i) qualita-
tive, aiming at identifying, classifying, and ranking the failure modes that would lead
to system failures and (ii), quantitative evaluation, aiming at evaluating the extent to
which some of the attributes are satisﬁed in terms of probabilities; those attributes
are then viewed as measures. The quantitative evaluation can be performed at diﬀer-
ent phases of the system’s life cycle: the design phase, the prototype phase and the
operational phase [20]. In the design phase, the dependability can be evaluated via
modeling and simulation, including simulated fault injection. During the operational
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phase, ﬁeld failure data analysis (FFDA) can be performed, aiming at measuring the
dependability attributes of a system according to the failures that naturally manifest
during system operation. When using FFDA, several issues arise related to data col-
lection, ﬁltering and analysis, which are extensively addressed in [20].
1.2.3 Software faults
The cause of a software error is always a bug, i.e., a software defect, which is permanent
since it lies into the code. This means that, if a program contains a bug, any circumstances
that cause it to fail once will always cause it to fail. This is the reason for which software
failures are often referred to as “systematic failures” [21]. However, the failure process, i.e.,
the way bugs are activated does not follow such a deterministic behavior at all. During
the execution of a program, the sequence of inputs, as well as the execution environment,
cannot be predicted, hence it is not possible to know with certainty which are the program’s
faults, and then its failures.Environmental conditions can activate a given fault rather than
another one, within a given execution of the program. This is especially true with respect
to complex and concurrent applications, in which sources of non determinism hold, due
to multithreading for example. Hence, it is licit to say that software faults can manifest
transiently. However, there are also faults which manifest permanently. These are likely
to be ﬁxed and discovered during the pre-operational phases of the system life cycle (e.g.,
structured design, design review, quality assurance, unit, component and integration testing,
alpha/beta test).
Software faults have been recognized to be the major cause of systems outages by J.Gray
in 1986 [5]. Since there, several attempts have been made to give a systematic view of the
kinds of faults which can aﬀect a program. The ﬁrst one, which is still a fundamental
milestone in the ﬁeld of software dependability, is the Orthogonal Defect Classiﬁcation
(ODC) of software faults, dating back to 1992 [22]. Its main contribution lies in the deﬁnition
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of a scientiﬁc approach suitable for a large class of systems, diﬀerently from the bespoke
solutions which were used before then. Indeed, it provides usable measurements that give
insights into the quality of the development process. Before ODC, evaluating a process,
diagnosing a problem, benchmarking, or assessing the eﬀectiveness of testing were tasks
that could not be executed with scientiﬁc rigor.
1.2.4 Orthogonal Defect Classiﬁcation
ODC encompasses software defects and triggers. The former are the “bugs”, whereas the
latter encompass those conditions which potentially activate faults thus letting them surface.
Software defects are grouped into orthogonal, non overlapping, defect types. Hence, a defect
type and one or more triggers are associated to each defect, as sketched in Figure 1.2.
Defect
Type
Trigger
Figure 1.2: Key concepts of ODC classiﬁcation
The following defect types are encompassed in [22]:
• Function - The fault aﬀects signiﬁcant capability, end-user interfaces, interface with
hardware architecture or global data structures and should require a formal design
change. Usually these faults aﬀect a considerable amount of code and refer to capa-
bilities either implemented incorrectly or not implemented at all.
• Interface - This defect type corresponds to errors in interacting with other components,
modules or device drivers, via macros, call statements, control blocks or parameters
lists.
• Assignment - The fault involves a few lines of code, such as the initialization of
17
control blocks or data structures. The assignment may be either missing or wrongly
implemented.
• Checking - This defect addresses program logic that has failed to properly validate
data and values before they are used. Examples are missing or incorrect validation of
parameters or data in conditional statements.
• Timing/Serialization - Missing or incorrect necessary serialization of shared resources,
wrong resources serialized or wrong serialization technique employed. Examples are
deadlocks or missed deadline in hard real time systems.
• Algorithm - This defect include eﬃciency and correctness problems that aﬀect the task
and can be ﬁxed by (re)implementing an algorithm or local data structure without
the need for requesting a design change.
• Build/package/merge - Describe errors that occur due to mistakes in library systems,
management of changes, or version control. Rather than being related to the product
under development, this defect type is mainly related to the development process,
since it aﬀect tools used for software development such as code versioning systems.
• Documentation - This defect type aﬀects both publication and maintenance notes. It
has a signiﬁcant meaning only in the early stages of software life cycle (Speciﬁcation
and High Level Design)
The concept of the software trigger was introduced in [8] where it was applied to failure
analysis from defects in the MVS operating system, with the intention of guiding fault-
injection. In the ODC perspective, they are deﬁned as “catalysts” able to activate dormant
software faults which surface as failures (see Figure 1.3). In an abstract sense, these are
operators on the set of faults to map them into failures; in practice, they are broad envi-
ronmental conditions or system activities. Faults which surface as failures for the ﬁrst time
after a product is released often have been dormant throughout the period of development,
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Fault Failure
Trigger 1
Trigger 2
Trigger n
Figure 1.3: ODC triggers.
i.e., they have not been discovered even if extensive testing has been performed. Ideally,
the defect trigger distribution exhibited on the ﬁeld should be similar to the distribution
observed in the test environment: signiﬁcant discrepancies between the two highlihgt po-
tential problems in the system test environment. There are speciﬁc requirements for a set
of triggers to be considered part of ODC. Basically, it requires that the distribution of an
attribute (such as trigger) changes as a function of the activity (process phase or time), to
characterize the process. The most used defect trigger categories are:
• Boundary Conditions - Software defects were triggered when the systems ran in par-
ticularly critical conditions (e.g.: low memory).
• Bug Fix - The defect surfaced after another defect was corrected. This may happen
either because the bug ﬁxed allowed users to executed a previously untested (and
buggy) area of the system, because in the same component where the bug was ﬁxed
there was another undiscovered bug, or because the ﬁx was not successfully, in that
it caused another defects on the same (or on a diﬀerent) component.
• Recovery - The defect surfaced after the system recovered from a previous failure.
• Exception Handling - The defect surfaced after an unforeseen exception handling path
was triggered.
• Timing - The defect emerged when particular timing conditions were met (e.g.: the
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application was deployed on a system with a diﬀerent thread scheduler).
• Workload - The defect surfaced only when particular workload condition were met
(e.g.: only after the number of concurrent requests to serve was higher than a partic-
ular threshold).
While defects give information about the development process, triggers are in charge
of providing feedback about the veriﬁcation process. Triggers and defect-type can be used
in conjunction: the cross-product of defect type and trigger provides information that can
estimate the eﬀectiveness of the process.
ODC addresses the problem of providing feedback to developers, which is a key issue of
measurement in the software development process. Without feedback to the development
team, the value of measurement is questionable and defeats the very purpose of data col-
lection. It ﬁlls the gap between statistical testing and causal analysis of defects, which is
due to the lack of fundamental cause-eﬀect relationship extractable from the process. Its
semantic power and orthogonality between products, have let ODC to be the starting point
for achieving many others research goal.
Beyond ODC
In [1], ODC has been extended for faults emulation and injection purposes. In authors’
opinion, the fault types provided by ODC are too broad for practical injection purposes,
hence they propose a further reﬁnement of ODC fault classes by analyzing faults from the
point of view of the (program) context in which they occur, and by relating the faults with
programming language constructs. From this perspective, a defect is one or more program-
ming language construct that is either missing, wrong, or in excess. Hence, they classiﬁed
each fault according to its nature: missing, wrong or extraneous construct. In particular,
the classiﬁcation has been performed by following three steps, starting by data collected on
the ﬁeld from several widely used software tools (e.g., CDEX data extractor or MingW).
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ODC has been used as a ﬁrst step. In the second step, faults were grouped according to
the nature of the defect, deﬁned from a building block programming perspective. For each
ODC class a software fault is characterized by one programming language constructs that
may be either missing, wrong or superﬂuous (instead, in ODC, the cause of software defect
can be an incorrect or a missing construct). In the third and last step, faults were further
reﬁned and classiﬁed in speciﬁc types. The ﬁnal result is the identiﬁcation of 18 fault types,
covering all the ODC faults categories, as shown in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Extended ODC classiﬁcation by Madeira et al. [1]
1.2.5 The failure process
The idea of triggers as catalysts for software faults surfacing, comes from the Gray’s intuition
that software faults are soft, similarly to some hardware, transient, faults [5]. The author
conjectured that some faults exist for which “if the program state is reinitialized and the
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failed operation retried, the operation will usually not fail the second time”.
With respect to ODC, this can be related to the concept of “ﬁeld faults”, i.e., residual
faults which escaped pre-operational quality assessment activities (e.g., testing campaigns),
and which did not surface even for months or years of production. These faults are due to
strange hardware conditions (rare or transient device fault), limit conditions (out of storage,
counter overﬂow, lost interrupt, etc.) or race conditions (forgetting to request a semaphore).
The trickiest issue when dealing with them is reproducibility: activation conditions depend
on complex combinations of the internal state and the external environment (i.e.: the set
made by up other programs, services, libraries, virtual machines, middleware and operating
systems the applications interacts with). Hence, they occur rarely and can be very diﬃcult
to reproduce: this dramatically complicates the tasks of error detection and faults diagnosis.
As such a behavior recall Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in Physics, these faults are well
known as “Heisenbugs” or elusive faults. Conversely, software faults which are easily
reproducible (e.g., through a debugger) are called solid faults or “Bohrbugs”. These are
likely to disappear over time, diﬀerently from Heisenbugs which rather increase with time,
as shown in Figure 1.4. This is because solid bugs are almost completely removed during the
pre-release phases of the software, by means debugging of and testing, as well as of structured
design. In a recent work by Trivedi, a further class of software faults has been deﬁned:
Mandelbugs [23]. They are faults whose activation is just apparently nondeterministic:
actually, there exists a condition under which the fault is deterministically activated, but
detecting this condition is so diﬃcult that the bug is labeled as non-deterministic. This
usually happens with complex software systems employing one or more interacting OTS
items. Mandelbugs are easily misinterpreted as Heisenbugs. However they are diﬀerent in
practice: the former are bugs whose causes are so complex that its behavior appears chaotic,
whereas the latter are computer bugs that disappear or alter its characteristics.
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Figure 1.4: Evolution of software faults during system life
1.2.6 Fault Injection for Software Dependability evaluation
Fault injection is the deliberate insertion of faults or errors (upsets) into a computer sys-
tem in order to determine its response [24]. It has been widely and eﬀectively used for
(i) measuring the parameters of analytical dependability models [25](ii), validating existing
fault-tolerant systems [26] (iii), observing how systems behave in the presence of faults [19],
and for comparing diﬀerent systems[27].
It was ﬁrst employed in the 1970s, and for the ﬁrst decade it has been used exclusively
by the industry for measuring the coverage and latency parameters of highly reliable sys-
tems. Academia approached fault injection not until the mid-1980s, when initial work
concentrated on understanding error propagation and analyzing the eﬃciency of new fault-
detection mechanisms. Since there, research has expanded to include characterization of
dependability at the system level and its relationship to the workload. However, in both the
academic community and industry, the most of the eﬀorts have been devoted to study the
eﬀects of physical hardware faults, i.e. faults caused by wear-out or external disturbances.
Since they have been recognized as the major cause of systems failure [5], research is chang-
ing its directions, paying a greater attention to the injection of software faults. So far,
studies concerning with software faults are few, especially when compared to the plethora
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Figure 1.5: Eﬀorts striven into fault injection by both industry and academia since the last
decades. Overlapping circles indicates the extent of the cooperation
of works addressing hardware reliability and its assessment via fault injection.
The transition from hardware to software faults injection is being painful for researchers in
this ﬁeld. The main why is the limited knowledge which is available about software faults,
along with the diﬃculties rising from their scarce reproducibility. However, the wide know
how which has been built for decades on hardware faults injection and dependability eval-
uation has been partially leveraged from researchers in the ﬁeld of software dependability,
e.g., by adapting hardware injection techniques to the injection of software faults.
Figure 1.5 shows the evolution of research about fault injection since 70’s. It conﬁrms that
these days software faults are the major concern for both industry and academia.
Since the focus of this dissertation is on software faults, and on how to detect and locate
them within a complex system, the attention is devoted to software faults injection. As
stated in [28], it acts as a “cristal ball” in that it is able to provide worst-case predictions
about how badly a piece of code might behave, diﬀerently from testing which is rather able
to assess how good software is.
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1.2.7 Software Fault injection fundamentals
By software fault it is meant a software defect which in fact corresponds to a bug into the
code. An error occurs if the fault is activated. It represents an erroneous state of the system
(e.g., a wrong value into a memory register) which can lead to a failure if it propagates to
the system interfaces, following the traditional deﬁnition of the propagation chain provided
in [15] (see Figure1.1 in the previous section). Note that, the deﬁnition of software fault as
a defect (i.e., the one used for ODC [8] implies that software requirements and speciﬁcations
are assumed to be correct, even if this does not always hold in practice. However, these
faults fall beyond the scope of this dissertation.
1.2.8 The WWW dilemma
While hardware faults are easy to inject since internal states can be eventually reduced
to a couple of values (“0” or “1”), software internal states are not so simple, thus making
researchers be in the horns of a great dilemma.
Even in a medium complex software program, many injection points exist and several in-
jection points could be identiﬁed: Where to inject? Additionally, it has to be established
the time for injecting the fault, as well as the time for its activation:When to inject?. Of
course, much time can be spent conducting a fault injection experiment if the injected faults
are rarely activated, hence the main question become: What to inject?. The W.W.W.
dilemma has to be faced, whose major concern is the need for representativeness, i.e., in-
jected faults should be representative of faults which can actually aﬀect the target software
in order to achieve meaningful results from the conducted experiments.
What to inject: injection or emulation? The most of the eﬀorts have been striven
so far in ﬁnding the most proper way to reproduce software faults via injection. Currently
two main ways have been identiﬁed, which can be used to pursue diﬀerent aims. Software
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faults can be reproduced either by modifying the source code of the target system i.e., by
injecting the actual fault (Software Mutation, SM ), or by means of error injection. SM
consists of the injection of the most common programmer’s mistakes into the source code.
Such a pragmatic approach allows to exactly reproduce the eﬀects of a fault, as well as of
injected all the kinds of faults, e.g., all the ones encompassed by ODC. However, if compared
with error injection and other injection approaches, it is more diﬃcult to implement. First
of all, it requires the availability of the source code hence it not suitable for closed source
components, as well as for legacy systems which can be diﬃcult to instrument. Additionally,
as discussed in [29], it is not easy to guarantee that the injected faults actually correspond
to the kinds of software faults that are most likely to be hidden in the code, and their
probability of future manifestation. For these reason, SM results cannot be used as an
absolute measure of risk; rather they are an eﬀective way for predicting worst case scenarios
in terms of software risks [30]. Hence, SM is considered as a “best eﬀort” approach for
reproducing software faults. In [31], this approach is used to compare disk and memory
resistance to operating systems crashes.
Reproducing software faults via emulation, i.e., by error injection, is very eﬀective mean to
accelerate typical residual faults, which are rarely activated. In fact, it allows to emulate
activations at a higher rate and to achieve the desired speedup of the fault activation
ratio [30].Errors can be injected both at memory level, i.e., by altering locations content,
and at procedures level, i.e., by corrupting input parameters and/or return values. The most
common technique for error injection is Software Implemented Fault Injection, SWIFI. It
has been traditionally and successfully used for hardware faults emulation via software:
since hardware functionality is largely visible through software, faults at various levels of
the system can be emulated. Several tools have been implemented in charge of completely
automating the process of injection, both of permanent and transient faults [32, 33, 34].
Recent studies have shown that many types of software faults can be emulated either by
traditional SWIFI as well [35, 36]. In practice, the target software application is interrupted
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(e.g., by means of a trap), and speciﬁc fault injection routines that emulate faults by
inserting errors in diﬀerent parts of the system (processor registers, memory) are executed,
prior to resume the correct run of the program. As for hardware faults, tools have also
been implemented for injecting software faults (e.g., [32]). When dealing with software
faults, the major drawback of SWIFI is that it does not allow to reproduce software faults
which require large modiﬁcations to the code, or which are due to design deﬁciencies, i.e.,
Algorithm and Function Faults (see the classiﬁcation in [8]), which account for a great part
of software faults in complex systems [1].
SM and SWIFI have been experimentally compared in [29], which is a seminal work
investigating the beneﬁts and drawbacks of both the techniques in terms of (i) the cost
of setup and execution time for using the techniques and (ii), the impact of the test case,
fault type and error type on the failure symptoms of the target system. It demonstrates
that injecting faults into the code, i.e., by means of SM, is deﬁnitely more accurate than
SWIFI, in terms of faults representativeness. The cost related results, instead, are in favour
of SWIFI which requires shorter setup and execution times.
A further alternative for emulating software faults is a binary mutation technique, named
G-SWFIT, which has been proposed by Madeira et al. in [1]. Similarly to SM, it is a fault
injection technique which corrupts executable code, rather than the source code. Hence,
SM and G-SWFIT share the goal of emulating the most common high level programming
mistakes, but they diﬀer in the target system level. The latter injects faults by mutations
introduced at the machine-code level. In practice, it consists of the emulation of high level
software fault through the modiﬁcation of the ready-to-run binary code of the target soft-
ware module. The modiﬁcations are such that they introduce speciﬁc changes corresponding
to the code that would have been generated by the compiler if the software faults were in
the high-level source code. G-SWFIT is performed in two steps. First, the fault locations
are identiﬁed before the actual experimentation, resulting in the set of faults to be injected.
Then, the faults are actually injected during the target execution. As the fault locations
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have been previously identiﬁed, the task of injection is low intrusive. The main advantage
of emulating the software faults at the machine-code level is that software faults can be
injected even when the source code of the target application is not available: this is very
important for the evaluation of OTS modules. Additionally, diﬀerently from other software
fault injection techniques (e.g., corruption of parameters in API calls, or bit-ﬂipping data
and address spaces) it tries to emulate the existence of the fault itself and not to emulate
its potential eﬀects. This means that by using G-SWFIT, faults are injected which are
due to actual software defects, thus achieving a better degree of authenticity of the system
behavior. However, when using G-SWFIT, it is tricky to assure that injection locations
actually reﬂect the high-level constructs where faults are prone to appear, and that binary
mutations are the same as generated by source code mutations. Additionally, it requires a
deep knowledge of the compiler generated instruction pattern, as well as of the optimization
settings used by compilers.
Where to inject. Regardless of what you are injecting, errors or faults, the injection
location is a crucial variable.
In the case of SM, faults can be injected both at components interfaces and internally, i.e.,
by modifying the internal source code of the target components. The main goal of injec-
tion at interfaces is to assess how sensitive the system is to faults in any of its software
components, and to emulate possible faults propagations. Interface faults can be injected
directly at the interface between components to simulate the situation where a component
fails and outputs corrupted information to the other components. The basic assumption is
that parameter corruptions at procedure calls reasonably emulate a real residual fault in
the caller component. However, there is no guarantee that injected values really correspond
to faults generated by the procedure invocation. Eminent studies injected faults at com-
ponents interface, especially in the context of robustness testing. In [37] faults have been
injected at Driver Programming Interface (DPI) to test the robustness of the Linux kernel;
injection at System Call Interface (SCI) has rather been performed by means of Ballista
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injection tool1.
Internal injection, instead, aims to uncover system pitfalls due to fault of its software mod-
ules. Internal hardware and software faults have been injected into the UNIX kernel by
means of FINE, which is a tool in charge of injecting faults and monitoring the target
system [38]. Authors mainly focus on hardware faults propagation within the system, and
they propose a valuable methodology for internal injection, which can be applied to several
contexts.
In [39] it has been demonstrated that these injection techniques are not equivalent, as they
result in diﬀerent system behaviors. In particular, by means of an experimental campaign,
authors demonstrated that injection at component interfaces, which is generally simpler to
implement than internal injection, does not represent residual software faults well. Further-
more, interface faults are not “representative” of internal faults as they do not have the
same impact on system dependability, i.e., internal faults cannot be emulated through the
injection of interface faults. However, both the two alternatives can be used together.
In the case of error injection, the problem of where to inject errors has been thoroughly
faced in [35]. Authors state that the joint distribution of faults over components and error
types over faults, i.e., the fault-error mapping, should be used to pinpoint injection loca-
tions. Once this joint distribution has been drawn, errors can be selected in a random way
among all the available locations. Of course, that joint distribution is gathered by ﬁeld
data.
When to inject Once again, the problem of ﬁnding the right time for injection holds
both for faults and error injection.
In the former case, when the source code of a given software component is modiﬁed, faults
are activated each time the corrupted piece of code is executed. This means that a fault
is present for the whole duration of an experiment. As for error injection, the problem
is slightly more complicated in that it is not easy to establish when a fault is actually
1http://ltp.sourceforge.net
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activated, i.e., it manifests as an error.
1.3 Related research on fault injection
Literature dealing with fault injection is abundant. It has been used to pursue several aims,
from dependability benchmarking to fault tolerant systems validation. However, there is
still a knowledge gap between injection of hardware and software faults. As for these, studies
have been mainly focused on software development phase, resulting in an improvement of
software development and testing methodologies, as well as of software reliability modeling
and risk analysis. However, little has been done with respect to the operational phase
of software systems, during which the operational environment and the software maturity
cannot be neglected. During this phase, “ﬁeld faults” (see [1]) can manifest which have never
occurred during the pre-deployment phase, hence software reliability should be studied in
the context of the whole system. This is especially true in the context of modular OTS
systems in which integration is a source of unpredictable behavior. The main diﬃculties to
be faced in this face come from (i) the need for collecting data (hence instrumentation is
required in many cases) and, (ii) the impact of system architecture (hardware and software).
1.3.1 Fault tolerance validation of complex systems
Fault tolerance validation is the natural ﬁeld of application of fault injection. Eminent
works focus on this topic, since early 90s. A large number of studies have shown the ef-
ﬁciency of the fault tolerance algorithms and mechanisms on the dependability of a wide
range of systems and architectures (e.g., [40]), hence the determination of the appropriate
model for the fault tolerance process and proper estimation of the associated coverage pa-
rameters is essential. Fault injection is particularly attractive to this aim as it is able to
test fault tolerance with respect to the faults that they are intended to tolerate, by speeding
up the occurrence of errors and failures. As pointed out in [41], fault injection addresses
30
both fault removal and fault forecasting. With respect to the fault removal objective, fault
injection is explicitly aimed at reducing, by veriﬁcation, the presence of design and imple-
mentation faults. As for fault forecasting, instead, the main issue is to rate, by evaluation,
the eﬃciency of the operational behavior of the fault tolerance mechanisms and algorithms,
e.g., their coverage. However, the fault tolerance coverage estimations obtained through
fault injection experiments are estimates of conditional probabilistic measures character-
izing dependability. They need to be related to the fault occurrence and activation rates
to derive overall measures of system dependability. For what concerns software faults, the
most common strategies for achieving fault tolerance are wrapping, N-version programming
and diversity. The eﬀectiveness of such techniques can be proved by fault injection, as it
has been done in [42] by means of the MAFALDA injection tool.
1.3.2 Software Testing
Fault injection is widely used as a mean for conducting software testing campaigns, to the
ultimate aim of testing the software in extreme and stressful conditions. In fact, injecting
faults into the code is an eﬀective way to quantify the impact of software faults from the
user’s point of view, and to get a quantitative idea of the potential risk represented by
residual faults. This allows the optimization of the testing phase eﬀort by performing risk
assessment and prediction of worst-case scenarios. For example, if the injection of software
faults in a given component causes a high percentage of catastrophic failures in the system,
it means that residual software faults in that component may represent a high risk and
more eﬀort should be put into the testing. Additionally, fault injection allows to perform
“what-if” analysis, which cannot be performed by traditional statistical testing techniques.
Examples of fault injection campaigns in the context of software testing can be found
in [43], where faults are injected via “assertion violation” to improve test coverage (e.g.,
to test recovery code which often remains untested even being error prone), and in [44]
in which authors present a methodology for fault injection in distributed-memory parallel
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computers that use a message-passing paradigm. Their approach is based on injection of
faults into interprocessor communications, and allows emulation of fault models commonly
used in design of fault-tolerant parallel algorithms.
1.3.3 Robustness Testing
Robustness is deﬁned as the degree to which a system operates correctly in the presence
of exceptional inputs or stressful environmental conditions (see IEEE Std 610.12.1990).
Robustness testing aims to develop test cases and test environments to assess the robustness
of both OTS items before integrating them into an existing software system and of the
robustness of a whole software system before moving it to the operational stage. Hence, it
has not been designed to be performed on operational systems. Fault injection is used to
perform robustness testing, in the form of invalid/out of range input injection
on the interfaces of the target application/API/system (e.g.: an empty string on
the ﬁle name parameter of an fopen() call).
A robustness test requires several steps. First system interfaces to test have been chosen,
then both valid and invalid inputs are selected according to the expected behavior of the
system (which can be retrieved from system speciﬁcation or API reference manuals). The
behavior of the system is then observed. The success criteria which is generally used with
respect to robustness tests is “if it does not crash or hang, then it is robust”, hence there
is no need for an oracle. If a failure occurs, this failure is classiﬁed according to a failure
severity scale. In [45], the 5-point “CRASH” scale has been deﬁned for grading the severity
of robustness vulnerabilities encountered, as well as for describing the result of robustness
tests2.
The ﬁrst works on robustness testing date back to early 90’s (e.g., [46]). However, the major
eﬀorts have been striven few years later, when [45] has been published comparing ﬁve UNIX
based OSs, and when the desirable features of a benchmark for system robustness are deﬁned
2CRASH is the acronym for Catastrophic, Restart, Abort, Silent, Hindering.
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in [47], along with a novel approach to build robustness benchmarks. The name of Ballista
is tightly related to robustness testing. It is a suite allowing automated robustness testing
by means of testing tools in charge of characterizing the exception handling eﬀectiveness of
software modules. For example, Ballista testing can ﬁnd ways to make operating systems
crash in response to exceptional parameters used for system calls, and can ﬁnd ways to
make other software packages suﬀer abnormal termination instead of gracefully returning
error indications. It is a “black box” software testing tool, and is works well on testing
the APIs of OTS (even Commercial, i.e., COTS) modules [48]. The suite has been ﬁrst
introduced in [49], dating back to 1998.
Robustness testing has been widely applied to OSs. Koopman at al. in [50] discuss
the comparison between the robustness of diﬀerent families of Operating Systems, namely
Windows and Linux. The paper presents a novel approach to deﬁne benchmarks which are
portable across OTS items with deeply diﬀerent interfaces. Indeed, while previous work
compared the robustness of Operating System with a similar System Call Interface (Unix-
based OSes), in this work the robustness of several version of the Windows Operating System
is compared to Linux’s robustness, by identifying common groups of system calls and then
analyzing the robustness for each of these groups. [37] discusses the impact of faulty drivers
on the robustness of the Linux kernel. By emulating faults at Driver Programming Interface
Level (DPI), that implements the way device drivers interact with the kernel, this paper
provides useful insights into the failure modes due to drivers’ faults and into the degree of
robustness of a target kernel with respect to faulty drivers. The information gathered also
enables to improve these interaction facilities.
1.3.4 Dependability Benchmarking
Dependability benchmarking has been introduced in 1997 and it aims to assess and charac-
terize the dependability level of a target system [47]. In particular, basing on fault injection,
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Figure 1.6: Dependability Benchmarking Components
it allows to evaluate dependability features of a component or sub-system of the whole sys-
tem, as well as to make comparative analysis between diﬀerent systems.
A dependability benchmark is “the speciﬁcation of a standard procedure to assess depend-
ability related measures of a computer system or computer component” [27].
Figure 1.6, drawn from [27], depicts the most important components of a dependability
benchmark. The Benchmark Target (BT) is the component or subsystem which is the
target of the benchmark with respect to its application area and operating environment.
Dependability measures (i.e.: the results of the dependability benchmark) are taken on
the BT (by either direct on indirect measurement), hence it has not to be altered by the
experiments (e.g., by injecting faults or by installing an invasive monitoring system).
The System Under Benchmarking (SUB) is the wider system which includes the above
described BT. For instance the SUB may be an Operating System while the Benchmark
Target may be a particular driver.
The Workload represents a typical operational proﬁle applied to the SUB in order to
benchmark the dependability of the BT. The selected workload should be representative of
real workloads applied to the SUB and also portable, especially when comparing diﬀerent
benchmark targets.
The Faultload consists of a set of faults and exceptional conditions that are intended to
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emulate the real threats the system would experience. Faults are applied to one or more
components of the SUB (diﬀerent from the BT) which constitute the Fault Injection Target
(FIT). The reliability of the dependability measures carried out by a dependability bench-
mark is strictly related with the representativeness of the selected faultload. Many relevant
works have been published on dependability benchmarking, focusing on several classes of
systems. As for OSs, their dependability has been benchmarked with respect to faulty
drivers [37] and with respect to application faults [51, 52, 53]. In the former case software
faults are injected into a particular driver, according to a “commonly observed” distribution
of these faults, whereas in the latter case faults are injected into the interface between the
OS and the application, by corrupting system call parameters.
Server applications (DBMS, OLTP,HTTP, . . . ) has also been benchmarked [54, 55]: soft-
ware faults are usually injected directly into the OS system class. OS proﬁlers are employed
to select the System Calls in which faults should be injected. Therefore the OS plays as the
FIT and the server application as the BT.
In [27], the speciﬁc problem of software faults with respect to dependability benchmark-
ing is addressed for the ﬁrst time. IN particular, the authors recognize that the most
critical task of a dependability benchmark is the deﬁnition of a portable, repeatable and
representative faultload. These properties are required to achieve the standardization of
the benchmark but they are very hard to get in the case of software faults. The authors
propose a new methodology for the deﬁnition of faultloads based on software faults for de-
pendability benchmarking, which are not tied to any speciﬁc software vendor or platform,
The work is based on G-SWFIT and the properties of the generated faultloads are analyzed
and validated through experimentation using a case study of dependability benchmarking
of web-servers.
If you try the best you can, the best
you can is good enough.
Radiohead - Optimistic
Chapter 2
The DLR framework
Software faults can manifest transiently, especially during the operational phase of the target system.
This means that transient manifestations of these faults cannot be discriminated as in traditional
diagnosis approaches. Furthermore, this hampers the deﬁnition of an exhaustive fault model at design
time. In the context of mission and safety critical systems, it is crucial to recover promptly from
these faults in order to avoid mishaps. Hence, a novel diagnosis approach is needed in charge of
encompassing transient manifestation of software faults, and of triggering eﬀective recovery actions
to let the system work properly. This chapter is going to (i) introduce the need for a novel approach
and (ii), to explain the one which is proposed in this thesis. It is is made up of a Detection, a
Location and a Recovery phase (DLR framework).
2.1 The need for DLR
The presence of software faults and their transient way of manifest prevent to deﬁne the
system fault model at design/development time completely. This means that faults can
manifest during the operational life of the system. Such faults never occurred during the
pre-release testing and debugging phases, which are far from being exhaustive due to the
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software size and complexity. The failures which result from these unexpected faults, known
as production run failures or ﬁeld failures (e.g., crashes, hangs and incorrect results), are
the major contributors to system downtime and dependability pitfalls [56]. While high
availability requirements, which govern both mission and business critical systems, require
the system downtime to be minimized, dependability pitfalls have to be warded oﬀ in order
to avoid catastrophic failures. To pursue these goals, it is necessary to face ﬁeld failures
by (i) locating where they come from and (ii), by recovering the system through fast and
proper recovery actions. In other words, a recovery oriented diagnosis is needed to preserve
system availability and to reduce the risk of mishaps (i.e., catastrophic failures).
Traditionally, diagnosis has been conceived as the process of identifying the root cause of
a failure i.e., it aimed solely to go up to the origin of the failure starting from its outward
symptoms. These symptoms were assumed as a given truth, i.e., the detection mechanisms
which signaled them were not a matter of interest for diagnosis. In the case of hardware
systems, for which it is possible to draw a complete fault model at design/development
time, this is a very eﬀective approach in that detectors could be designed at that time as
well. Unfortunately, this does not hold for software faults, which make the fault model of
a system evolving over time. Hence, the detection has to be included into the diagnosis
process, i.e., a novel approach has to be designed in charge of making detectors aware of
errors which can manifest on the ﬁeld. The ﬁrst attempt to combine detection and location
to perform fault diagnosis has been made by Vaidya et al.in [10], where the problem of
distributed systems recovery from a large number of faults was addressed. The authors
demonstrate that by combining detection and location adaptively, the number of diagnosed
faults increases at a low additional cost.
Most of the previous work which has been conducted on software faults diagnosis in the last
few years proposed oﬀ-line diagnosis approaches. These approaches, which require human
involvement to discover the bug, are not suitable for ﬁeld failures for a number of reasons.
37
Figure 2.1: Fault propagation
First of all, it is diﬃcult to reproduce failure-triggering conditions in house in order to per-
form diagnosis. Second, oﬀ-line failure diagnosis cannot provide timely guidance to select
a recovery action which is tailored for the particular fault that occurred. Last, but more
important, the time to recover has to be minimized for the sake of availability and safety.
Figure 2.1 shows how a fault can manifest in a failure. Triggering conditions, which have
been introduced by ODC (see section 1.2.4), can activate a fault depending on the execution
environment, as well as on load conditions. Traditional testing and debugging techniques,
as well as static code analysis, aim to discover software bugs by means of a “blind” code
screening. Although useful information about errors and failures can be gathered by means
of this screening, there is no way to understand the propagation path, i.e., what is the root
cause of the discovered error/failure. Conversely, the problem of diagnosis is driven by the
occurrence of a given failure and it aims to trace its origin in terms of (i) what are the
execution misbehaviors which caused its occurrence (ii), where these misbehaviors come
from and (iii), what are the triggering conditions which activated the fault.
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2.2 System model and assumptions
In this thesis, diagnosis is going to be performed on complex software systems, deployed
on several nodes and in charge of communicating through a network infrastructure. Each
node oe the system is organized in software layers and it is made up of several Diagnosable
Units (DUs), representing atomic software entities, at it is shown in Figure 2.2. In most
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Figure 2.2: System’s node model
of the cases the layered structure of each node encompasses the Operating System (OS),
the Middleware and the User Application levels. Such a structure has been used in this
thesis as it focuses on software faults, rather than on hardware threats, thus the underlying
hardware equipment has not been taken into account. This assumption sounds reasonable
since modern systems are equipped with redundant and highly reliable hardware platforms
which are developed and extensively tested in house, especially in the case of mission and
safety critical systems. This means that hardware related faults will be not diagnosed by
the DLR framework proposed in this thesis. However, hardware faults are very likely to be
conﬁned within the hardware/ﬁrmware levels by the high-performance hardware treatment
built-in mechanisms.
DUs are assumed to be OS processes. This means that a process is the smallest entity which
can be aﬀected by a failure, and for which it is possible to diagnose faults, as well as to
trigger recovery actions. Of course, the bug which caused the process to fail can be located
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Figure 2.3: Diagnosis at process level.
within an OTS library or module which is being executed in the context of the process;
additionally, propagations can occur among diﬀerent nodes and layers. Look at Figure 2.3,
where the process P1 experiences a failure due to the component C. However, the failure is
actually located into the D library, which is running in the context of a diﬀerent process,
P2 and the bug propagates to C through y, e.g., due to an erroneous input from D to y.
According to a recovery oriented perspective, addressing the process as the atomic entity
of the system, it is enough to identify the cause which induced the failure of the process,
within the context of the process itself. In other words, if a recovery action has been deﬁned
in charge of recovering the failed process by only acting on it, it is unnecessary to go back
through the propagation chain out of the context of the process. From Figure 2.3, the
failure of P1 will be attributed to y, which is the last link in the propagation within the
P1 context. Once the root cause has been identiﬁed, the proper recovery action has to be
selected. Hence, the ﬁnal output of diagnosis consists of a couple of vectors (D,R). The
former associates the failed node, by means of the IP address, to the failed process which is
identiﬁed by the Process ID (PID). The latter, instead, associates the experienced failure
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(f) to the recovery action to be initiated (r). Schematically
D = (IPfailednode, P IDfailedprocess)
R = (Failuref , Recoveryr)
The diagnosis output provides information about the failed process, rather than about the
component which caused the failure. This information would not be interesting for the ﬁnal
users. However, it could be helpful for bug ﬁxing and fault removal.
Crash, hangs and workload failures are encompassed by the proposed approach. A
process crash is the unexpected interruption of its execution due either to an external
or an internal error. A process hang, instead, can be deﬁned as a stall of the process.
Hangs can be due to several causes, such as deadlock, livelock or waiting conditions on
busy shared resources. As for workload failures, they depend on the running application.
Workload failures can be both value- (e.g., erroneous output provided by a function) or
timing failures.
Since the target systems are distributed on several nodes, and since faults can propagate,
the set of the failures to be encompassed is given by FM = FxDUs, i.e., by the product
set of the failure types and of all the DUs (i.e., the processes).
2.2.1 Recovery Actions
The proposed DLR framework encompasses two classes of recovery actions:
• System Level Recovery, i.e., actions which aim to repair a failed process by acting
at system level. These actions are intended for dealing with crashes and hangs, and
they can be more or less costly depending on the size of the system, as well as on the
number of processes involved into the failure. Encompassed actions are system reboot,
application restart and process kill. Once one of these actions has been performed,
additional facilities, e.g. fault tolerance mechanisms provided by the middleware layer,
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will be able to restore the application.
• Workload Level Recovery, i.e., action which aim to repair application failures.
These actions are intended for dealing with workload failures, hence a knowledge of
the application semantic is required, as well as of its business logic.
2.3 The overall approach
Figure 2.4 gives an overall picture of the proposed approach, representing how it works from
the fault occurrence till system recovery.
During the operational phase of the system, a monitoring system performs continuous de-
tection. Once a failure (F ) has occurred, an alarm is triggered which does initiate the
Location phase. During the location, the root cause of the failure is looked for; once this
has been completed, the Recovery phase is started in order to recover the system and to
resume normal activities. Let Ld, Ll and Lr be the times required for performing detec-
tion, location and recovery, respectively. This means that the entire DLR process will be
completed in L = Ld + Ll + Lr, at worst. The task of detection consists of the alarm
time
F
Operational phase
Detectiont ti
Detectiont ti Locationti
Detectiont ti Locationti Recoveryr
retraining
LD LL LR
Figure 2.4: A time snapshot of the overall DLR approach
triggering when a given process fails. Since the failure of the overall system is not a certain
consequence of a process failure, i.e., if a process fails it is not assured that the system will
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fail as well, a process failure is conceived as an error for the system as a whole. For this
reason, the task of detection is in fact error detection.
The overall approach is based on the machine learning paradigm, as in many previous pa-
pers focusing on diagnosis [57, 58, 59]. The main reason for this is the presence of ﬁeld
failures, which cannot be known at design/development time. Indeed, such a paradigm
makes the DLR engine, and all of its components, able to learn over time. Hence, ﬁeld
failures inﬂuence the design of the entire engine, from detection to recovery.
As for detection, an error is deﬁned as a corruption in the state of a DU , which can im-
pact in turn on the state of the system. An alarm is triggered whenever an anomaly is
encountered in system behavior; this is achieved by means of anomaly detection, i.e., all
the conditions which deviate from normal behaviors are labeled as errors. This is quite a
pessimistic detection strategy. In fact, not all the anomalies correspond to actual errors,
i.e., errors could be signaled even when the system is behaving correctly but that condition
has not been recognized as normal. On the one hand, such a pessimistic strategy leads to a
non negligible amount of false positives, in that alarms are likely to be triggered which do
not correspond to actual errors. On the other hand, it allows to minimize the number of
errors which is misinterpreted as normal behaviors, thus going unnoticed. This is crucial in
the context of critical systems in that unsignaled errors are in fact false negatives which may
have catastrophic eﬀects. It is worth noting that reducing false positives, i.e., maximizing
detection accuracy, at design time has been the primary goal to be pursued for the most of
the previous work focusing on fault/errors detection. Details about the detection strategy,
as well as about the architecture of the detection module will be given in chapter 3.
Once an alarm has been triggered, the Location phase is initiated to identify its root cause.
Along with the aim of pinpointing the actual fault, this phase has also to remedy detection
falls. More precisely, during this phase the presence of an actual fault has to be established,
since false positives are likely to be triggered by the detectors. This means that the location
module behaves “distrustfully” to compensate the pessimistic detection. This is achieved
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by the means of the machine learning paradigm, in the form of classiﬁcation. Indeed, clas-
siﬁcation and pattern recognition methods are viable, if no further knowledge is available
for the relationships between the errors (i.e., the features) and the faults. The features
are determined experimentally for certain faults. The relation between features and faults
is therefore learned (or trained) experimentally, and then stored thus forming an explicit
knowledge base. Faults can be concluded by comparing of the observed features with the
nominal feature. Starting from manifestations (i.e., the errors), the location module has
to infer the presence of a fault and to associate it to a class. To design the fault classes
properly, three circumstances has to be considered:
1. SUSPECTED ERROR (SE): the triggered alarm was not the manifestation of an
actual fault, i.e., detectors triggered a false positive. In this case, there is no need
neither for location nor for system recovery;
2. ERROR: a fault actually occurred that the location module is able to identify. In this
case, recovery actions have to be associated to the fault and initiated immediately;
3. UNKNOWN FAULT: the triggered alarm was actually due to a fault which cannot
be identiﬁed during the location. This is the tricky case of a fault which is unknown,
i.e., a fault that never occurred before. In this case, the system has to be put in
a safe state, and further investigations are needed which can even require human
intervention.
The location capability of uncovering false positives allows to improve the detection ac-
curacy. This is the main goal of the feedback branch, named “retraining”, depicted in
Figure 2.4: once an alarm has been labeled as a SE, the detection module is upgraded
consequently. This will allow to reduce the number of false positives over time, as well as
the quality of the overall DLR process, as it will be shown in chapter 5. Of course, the
frequency of detection module updates has to be established depending on its complexity.
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This is likely to depend on the classiﬁer being used, as well as on the communication mech-
anisms between the location and the detection module. Hence, despite of the generality of
the process, operations have to be planned according to the particular system under study.
The process of classiﬁcation, along with the details about the classiﬁers used to perform
location, will be described in chapter 5.
Recovery actions to be initiated in the case of an ERROR have been associated to the fault
classes. This is to perform recovery actions which are tailored for the particular fault that
occurred. This is a novel idea in ﬁeld of faults diagnosis: to the best of author knowledge
this has not been proposed yet in the literature.
Since the approach is intended for operational systems, two main phases are encompassed.
During the ﬁrst phase, the DLR engine is trained in order to build a starting knowledge.
This corresponds to a preoperational phase of the system, used to setup and tune the en-
gine properly. The knowledge built this way is leveraged during the second phase, i.e., the
operational phase of the target system. Figure 2.5 depicts the training process. In order to
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Figure 2.5: Training of the DLR engine
train the detection module, which performs anomaly detection, faulty free executions (i.e.,
correct executions) of the system have to be run in order to model its normal behavior (1).
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Conversely, fault injection (2) is required in order to allow (i) the deﬁnition of the fault
classes (3.a) and (ii), the collection and analysis of fault related data to model system be-
havior in faulty conditions (3.b). DUs running into the system, which are depicted as little
triangles in the Figure, are the injection target. Once faults have been injected, the super-
vised training1 of the location classiﬁer is performed (4), according to the pseudo-algorithm
in Figure 2.6. At the end of the training phase, both the detection and the location classi-
FOR each node i 
FOR all the processes j running on i 
FOR each fault location k into the code of (i,j) 
failure= do_injection(fault,k,i,j)    
//do the injection , wait for a while then analyze failed processes
IF (failure ==UNKNOWN) {
ADD fault to the set of KNOWN faults
ASSOCIATE recovery mean to the injected fault
ENDIF
COLLECT data from detector related to the last D seconds
CREATE the entry (detector_ouput, failure)
ADD the entry to the training set
ENDFOR
ENDFOR
ENDFOR
FOR each collected entry
do_supervised_training(classifier)  
ENDFOR
Figure 2.6: Supervised training of the location classiﬁer
ﬁers can rely on a starting knowledge about the target system. On the one hand this can be
exploited during the operational phase. On the other hand, the base knowledge has to be
improved during the system lifetime adaptively in order to take ﬁelds failures into account.
2.4 Related Work
The issue of diagnosis has been being faced since a long time, maybe since computers came.
The ﬁrst attempt to formalize the problem is due to Preparata et al. which introduced
1Details about this learning strategy are provided in chapter 5
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system level diagnosis in [12]. Since then, diagnosis has been faced by following several
approaches and in many research ﬁelds: although signiﬁcant progresses have been done, the
problem is still far away from the solution.
The model they proposed in 1967 (also known as the PMC model) assumed the system
to be made up of several units which test one another, and test results are leveraged to
diagnose faulty units. Several extensions to this model have been proposed, even recently
(e.g., [60] where the safe system level diagnosis has been proposed by Vaydia et al.)
In the last decade or so, there has being an increasing work focusing on the diagnosis
problem which is getting faced by several perspectives, and by means of quite diﬀerent
techniques from a variety of research ﬁelds. On the one hand, such a generous literature is
a beneﬁt in that approaches and techniques exist which can be leveraged and improved with
respect to the particular domain. On the other hand, this can be disorienting and drawing
a systematic picture of the existing literature becomes an hard task. The bibliographic
analysis conducted in the context of this thesis was aimed at giving a more clear overview of
the available research results, by identifying similarities and divergences among the existing
works, as well as with the approach proposed in the thesis.
2.4.1 Similar approaches to similar problems (SASP)
The goal of identifying the root cause of a failure automatically is pursued in [57]. Authors
propose a trace-based problem diagnosis methodology, which relies on the trace of low level
system behaviors to deduce problems of computer systems. Transient events occurring in
the system (e.g., system calls, I/O requests, call stacks, context switches) are traced in
order to (i) identify the correlations between system behaviors and known problems and
(ii), use the learned knowledge to solve new coming problems. This goals are achieved by
means of statistical learning techniques, based on Support Vector Machines (SVMs), as it is
proposed in this thesis. The ultimate aim that authors want to pursue is to make the prob-
lem identiﬁcation fully automatic, thus eliminating human involvement. The goal which is
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pursued in this thesis is diﬀerent, in that the trigger of recovery actions is also considered.
Furthermore, the symptom of the problem needs to be reproduced before the root cause
detection.
A decision tree based approach is presented in [58] to diagnose problems in Large Internet
Services. Similarly to what this thesis proposes, runtime properties of the system (they
record clients requests) are monitored; automated machine learning and data mining tech-
niques are used to identify the causes of failures. The proposed approach is evaluated by
measuring precision and recall, the two most used metric which have been considered in
this thesis too for evaluating diagnosis quality. However, the point which makes this work
diﬀerent in spirit from this thesis, concerns with detection. In fact, detection is not en-
compassed in [58]: authors assume problems to have been already detected and they only
concentrate on identifying the root cause, in order to trigger a fast recovery.
2.4.2 Similar approaches to diﬀerent problems (SADP)
[61] proposes automated support for classifying reported software failures in order to facil-
itate the diagnosing of their root causes. The authors use a classiﬁcation strategy which
makes use of supervised and unsupervised pattern classiﬁcation , as it is done in this thesis
for location and detection respectively. Additionally, they also concentrate on the impor-
tance of features selection and extraction. However, the classiﬁcation performed in this
work aims to group failures which are due to the same cause and it is conceived as a mean
for helping actual diagnosis. Conversely, in this thesis diagnosis is actually performed by
means of classiﬁcation.
A very recent work which uses a machine learning approach based on SVM classiﬁcation
is [62]. Its main goal is to predict the presence of latent software bugs in software changes
(change classiﬁcation). In particular, a machine learning SVM classiﬁer is used to determine
whether a new software change is more similar to prior buggy changes or clean changes. In
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this manner, change classiﬁcation predicts the existence of bugs in software changes. The
work shares with this thesis the classiﬁcation problem and its formulation.
Machine learning approach has also been used in [59] for identifying program properties that
indicate errors. The technique generates machine learning models of program properties
known to result from errors, and applies these models to program properties of user-written
code to classify the properties that may lead the user to errors. SVMs and decision trees are
used for classiﬁcation. The eﬀectiveness of the proposed approach has been demonstrated
with respect to C, C++, and Java programs. However it requires human labor to ﬁnd the
bugs, and the process is not fully automatic.
Aguilera et al. [63] address the problem of locating performance bottlenecks in a dis-
tributed system with only internode communication traces. They infer the causal paths
through multi-tier distributed applications from message level traces, in order to detect the
node causing extraordinary delay. They share with this thesis the great attention which
is paid to the presence of OTS items, as well as the fact that the approach requires no
modiﬁcations to applications and middleware. The major diﬀerences concern (i) the fact
that the pay more attention to performance rather than on faults and (ii), the fact that
they perform oﬀ-line diagnosis of the problem.
As for Bayesian estimation, a worth noting work to be referred is [64] which addresses system
diagnosis problems. It refers to comparison-based system analysis to deal with incomplete
test coverage, unknown numbers of faulty units, and non-permanent faults. However, only
one type of monitor is used in that work and also recovery is not encompassed.
2.4.3 Diﬀerent approaches to similar problems (DASP)
Closely related to the goals of this thesis are the aims of [13], which cares automatic model
driven recovery in distributed systems. Similarly to what this thesis proposes for detection,
authors exploit a set of a limited coverage monitors whose output are combined in a cer-
tain way prior to trigger recovery actions. Additionally they also have a Bayesian Faults
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Diagnosis engine in charge of locating the problem, as well as to pilot a recovery controller
that can choose recovery actions based on several optimization criteria. Similarly to what is
proposed here, the approacj described in [13] is able to detect whether a problem is beyond
its diagnosis and recovery capabilities, and thus to determine when a human operator needs
to be alerted. Despite of these common purposes, this thesis takes an opposite perspective,
in that a model based approach has been discarded: modeling complex software systems
could be too diﬃcult and inaccurate for the purposes of diagnosis. Additionally, this thesis
work is diﬀerent in several points. First, authors of [13] propose incremental recovery ac-
tions whereas here the best one action able to repair the system is started directly. Second,
here the entire set of “always-on” monitors is always used detect errors instead of invoking
additional monitors when needed, as they do. Third, fault injection has been used in this
thesis to experimentally prove the eﬀectiveness of the approach rather than for making a
comparison with a theoretical optimum. This has not been encompassed in [13].
[65] deals with the problem of diagnosis in networked environments made up of black-box
entities. This goal is achieved by (i) tracing messages to build a causal dependency struc-
ture between the components (ii), by tracing back the causal structure when a failure is
detected and (iii), by testing components using diagnostic tests. Runtime observations are
used to estimate the parameters that bear on the possibility of error propagation, such as
unreliability of links and error masking capabilities. The work aims to provide diagnosis of
the faulty entities at runtime in a non-intrusive manner to the application. Diﬀerently from
this work, in this thesis a causal structure of the system is not built since any assumptions
on the structure of the system itself is made. The main point in common is the fact is the
on-line diagnosis strategy.
[66] deﬁnes a methodology for identifying and characterizing dynamic dependencies be-
tween system components in distributed application environments, which relies on active
perturbation of the system. This is in order to identify dependencies, as well as to compute
dependency strengths. Even if discovering system dependencies automatically could be a
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good way for root cause analysis, it is assumed a deep knowledge of the dynamics of the
system dynamics. In particular, authors assume to completely know end-users interaction
with the system (they use a well known TPC benchmark). The opposite position is taken
by this thesis, in that knowledge is not required. Furthermore, the Active Dependency
Discovery approach deﬁned in that work, is strongly intrusive and workload dependent.
A further worth referring work is [67], where the Pinpoint framework is deﬁned. It employs
statistical learning techniques to diagnose failures in a Web farm environment. After the
traces with respect to diﬀerent client requests are collected, data mining algorithms are used
to identify the components most relevant to a failure. This thesis shares with that work
the “learning from system behavior” philosophy. However, there is a diﬀerence in goals, the
faults detection and diagnosis are performed in order to determine the cause of the failure
and trigger recovery action. Conversely, Pinpoint aims to recognize which component in a
distributed system is more likely to be faulty. Fault injection is used also in [67] to prove
the eﬀectiveness of the approach. The major limitation of this approach are that (i) it is
suitable only for small scale software programs, and (ii) it exhibit a signiﬁcant logging. The
approach proposed in this thesis diﬀers from that work in two main points: (i) the Pinpoint
framework is designed to work oﬀ-line and (ii), it is not a recovery-oriented approach.
Finally, on-site failure diagnosis is faced in [56]. The work aims to capture the failure point
and conduct just-in-time failure diagnosis with checkpoint and re-execution system support.
Lightweight checkpoints are taken during execution and rolls back are performed to recent
checkpoints for diagnosis after a failure has occurred. Delta generation and delta analysis
are exploited to speculatively modify the inputs and execution environment to create many
similar but successful and failing replays to identify failure-triggering conditions. Such an
approach has been discarded in this thesis since Heisenbugs (and even worse Mandelbugs
[23]) can be unreproducible this way: in fact, their conditions of activation are hard to iden-
tify. Furthermore, long time is required (almost ﬁve minutes) to complete the process: this
can be not tolerable for safety critical systems.
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Table 2.1: Related work summary
REF CAT OBJ TECHNIQUE
[57] SASP Root Cause Analysis Machine Learning (SVM)
[61] SADP Software failures Pattern identiﬁcation
automatic classiﬁcation in execution proﬁles
[13] DASP Detection, location Model based;
and recovery Bayesian/Markov estimation
[62] SADP Latent software Machine Learning
SADP bugs prediction (SVM)
[65] DASP Arbitrary Failures Runtime observation
Probabilistic Diagnosis messages propagation
[58] SASP Recovery Oriented Runtime trace Logging;
Failure Diagnosis Machine learning (Dec.tree)
[59] SADP Latent software Machine Learning (SVM;Dec. Tree);
bugs discovery Dynamic Analysis
[66] DASP Root cause analysis Active Dynamic Dependencies
[63] SADP Testing/Debugging; Message tracing;
Performance bottlenecks isolation Causal Pattern Identiﬁcation
[67] DASP Root Cause Analysis; Message tracing;
Automatic Problem Identiﬁcation Data mining and clustering
[56] DASP Production failures on site diagnosis; Checkpointing; rollback;
Testing/debugging Static and dynamic analysis
There is no teaching to compare with
example
Robert Baden Powell
Chapter 3
Faults and Error Detection
This chapter aims to illustrate the detection approach proposed in this thesis. It leverages the OS
support to detect application failures, which could be not properly detected otherwise. In fact, it
allows to detect failures which manifest as kernel hangs, even being generated at application level,
and which are not detected by the application and middleware built-in mechanisms in many cases.
The kernel self-detection capability, i.e., its ability to detect kernel hangs, have been investigated
in order to quantify its trustworthiness. Notwithstanding the eﬀectiveness of the kernel detection
means, some deﬁciencies emerged, hence a detection algorithm has been implemented to improve
their quality. The overall detection architecture, aiming to detect application failures, is composed
of several monitors, whose responses have been combined by a global detector. The implemented
algorithm for kernel hangs detection has been used as a monitor, thus making the system in charge
of detecting application failures which manifest at OS the level and improving the overall detection
quality.
The terminology
In this thesis, detection has been faced at diﬀerent levels, from the lowermost one, the OS,
to the uppermost, i.e., the applications. Hereafter we refer to error detection: it aims is to
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detect errors prior them to degenerate into failures for other system components, or for the
overall system.
3.1 Existing approaches to the problem of detection
Two main lines have been followed in the literature for coping with the problem of detection.
The former is a theoretical line, that tries to give a formalization of the problem, especially
for what concerns with quality evaluation. The milestone work in this context is [68], that
studies the quality of service (QoS) of failure detectors in message-passing distributed sys-
tems in which processes may fail by crashing, and messages may be delayed or dropped by
communication links. By failure, it is meant a process crash in these systems. The quality
of the detection quantiﬁes (a) how fast the failure detector detects actual failures1, and (b)
how well it avoids false detections. Latency and accuracy metrics are associated to these
measures, respectively.
The latter line, instead, addresses the problem of detection empirically, taking the QoS
topics addressed in [68] as a reference point for validating systems and mechanisms.
Following this line, detection strategies can be implemented as local or remote detection
modules, depending on whether they are or not deployed on the same node of the mon-
itored component. Local and remote detection can be implemented with query-based or
log-based techniques. Query-based techniques rely on interrogating the monitored entity
health status, to discover potential anomalies. The query can be performed periodically
(heartbeat techniques, such as [69, 70]), or implicitly each time another distributed entity
tries to invoke the monitored one [68].
Log-based techniques, instead, consist in analyzing the log ﬁles produced by the entity, if
available [71, 72]. In fact, these may contain many useful data to understand the system
dependability behavior, as shown by many studies on the ﬁeld [73, 74]. Moreover, logs are
1we refer to failures as the authors do that in this work
54
the only direct source of information available in the case of OTS items.
Both query-based and log-based techniques can be considered as direct detection techniques:
they try to infer the entity health status by directly querying it, or by analyzing data items
it is able to log. A diﬀerent approach lies into infer the health of the observed entity by
monitoring its behavior from an external viewpoint, along with its interactions with the
environment. These approaches can be labeled as indirect detection techniques. As an ex-
ample, the work in [75] exploits hardware performance counters and OS signals to monitor
the system behavior and to signal possible anomalous conditions. A similar approach is fol-
lowed in [76], which provides detection facilities for large scale distributed systems running
legacy code. The detection system proposed here is an autonomous self checking monitor,
which is architecture independent and it has a hierarchical structure. The monitors are
designed to observe the external messages that are exchanged between the protocol entities
of the distributed system under study. They use the observed messages to deduce a runtime
state transition diagram (STD) that has been executed by the all the entities in the system.
Indirect techniques have been especially adopted for intrusion detection systems. In these
cases, anomaly detection approaches are used to compare normal and anomalous runs of the
system. In [77] the execution of a program is characterized by tracing patterns of invoked
system calls. System call traces produced in the operational phase are then compared with
nominal traces to reveal intrusion conditions.
Other solutions, such as [78, 79], are based on data mining approaches, such as document
classiﬁcation. They extract recurrent execution patterns (using system calls or network
connections) to model the application under nominal conditions, and to classify run-time
behaviors as normal or anomalous. Such solutions are able to achieve high quality, in terms
of all the metrics we deﬁned in section 3.2. However, they require high computational load
due to the huge amount of collected data. They have been widely used to detect intrusions:
to the best of our knowledge, they have not been applied to transient software faults yet.
All these solutions are not intended for diagnosis. They work as autonomous detection
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systems, hence they do not have location in mind. Additionally, none of them faces the
problem of transient software faults, which are the trickiest issue in the context of complex
OTS based software systems. This is especially true in the case of complex concurrent
applications, where multi-threading and shared resources represent a source of nondeter-
minism in the application behavior, at execution time. In these systems, detection has to
take place during the operational phase of the system (i.e., on-line). For these reasons, both
direct application level techniques ( such as polling the health status of system components
via heartbeat) and log based techniques fail when dealing with these systems. On the one
hand, the implementation of simple heartbeat schemes generally requires extra code. On
the other hand, log-based detection typically requires a signiﬁcant computational load to
be performed on-line; for instance data mining techniques are used often. Furthermore,
direct techniques may result inadequate at detecting software hangs. These are usually
due to synchronization faults (that are in fact Heisenbugs), and they manifest as inﬁnite
loops (active hangs) or indeﬁnite wait conditions (passive hangs). First, the hang might
be localized on a diﬀerent thread than the one that answers to the heartbeat. Hence, the
entity correctly answers to polls, while portions of it result permanently hang. Second, it
is hard to tell whether it does not respond to queries or it does not log any data because it
is really hang or it is just “very slow” (e.g., it might be overloaded or correctly blocked on
a waiting condition).
Indirect detection techniques, that have been recently introduced in the literature, allow to
overcome these limitations. The system is observed through low level parameters related to
the entity of interest (e.g., invoked system calls, hardware performance counters), in order
to build a model of the correct or expected behavior of the system. In this thesis, an indirect
detection approach is proposed, as it is detailed in the rest of this chapter.
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3.2 Detection quality metrics
In order to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of detection mechanisms and strategies, as well as
to make comparisons among diﬀerent approaches, quality metrics are deﬁned. The two
main metrics which are generally used in this context, i.e., latency and accuracy, have been
deﬁned in [68] (see section3.1).
In this thesis, these two metrics have been used, along with a third metric, the Coverage
Cdet, which takes into account the number of events which are properly detected. This
is mainly due to the fact the reference failure model encompasses failures which are more
diﬃcult to detect than crash failures (which are usually the only failures taken into account)
hence, there is a non zero probability of having undetected failures. Formally, we follow:
1. Detection accuracy, i.e., the percentage of detected events which actually occurred. It
is the detector ability to avoid false positives.
2. Detection coverage, i.e., the detector capacity to uncover failures. It can be measured
as the number of detected failures divided by the overall number of failures which
actually occurred.
3. Detection latency, i.e., the time between the occurrence of the event and its detection.
3.3 The role of the Operating System
The intuition behind the detection approach proposed in this thesis, is that the OS can be
leveraged to overcome the limitations of the detection approaches which have been proposed
so far to detect application failures.
As discussed in section 3.1, direct techniques are the most common. They place the ob-
servation mean at the same level they want to observe, e.g., they try to detect applica-
tions/middleware errors by using the logs provided by the application/middleware itself.
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This has serious limitations. First, some events may cause the system to get blocked com-
pletely, thus excluding the possibility of exploiting built-in detection mechanisms. In other
words, if the system is hang, the process in charge of detection may get hang too, thus being
unable of providing useful information. Second, some events could be the eﬀect of low level
causes, i.e., of faults located under the observation point (e.g., application failures due to
an error in the middleware), hence they could be not “visible” to the observer (as depicted
by the blue arrows in Figure 3.1). Last, but most important, there are application failures
Figure 3.1: Indirect detection techniques observation point of view.
which can manifest at OS level in the form of kernel hangs (the green arrows in Figure 3.1).
Hence, they can only be detected by observing the system by the OS point of view.
Query-based techniques, that do not suﬀer such limitations, require extra code to be added
into the monitored module in order to answer to queries, that is not feasible for OTS items.
This is overcome by log-based techniques which, however, are usually computationally inef-
ﬁcient, hence they are not eﬀective for on-line detection. Furthermore, they are complicated
by the heterogeneity of log ﬁles, as OTS items produce log ﬁles with diﬀerent formats.
For these reasons, the detection approach proposed in this thesis is based on an indirect
detection technique.
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3.4 Operating system self-detection capabilities
As OSs play a key role in the detection process, in that they support upper layers detec-
tion mechanisms, their self-detection capabilities (i.e., the ability of detecting their own
failures) have to be investigated. Indeed, OS logs represent the most valuable way to detect
erroneous states of a complex, OTS-based, system, as well as an eﬀective mean to catch
application failures which manifest into the kernel. Such logs have been exploited as the
main detection mean in [80] for failure prediction, and in [4] for fault diagnosis and treat-
ment. However, several studies uncovered logging deﬁciencies in the most famous OSs such
as [74], which pointed out that information about the cause of Windows NT OS reboots
were not provided in many cases, and [81, 82], where it has been demonstrated that OS
logs can even be misleading, as they can provide false detections.
In this thesis, kernel logging capabilities of the Linux OS have been investigated in order
to decide whether a critical system can actually rely on them, or some additional facilities
are needed to perform a high quality detection.
3.4.1 Kernel failure modes
Kernel failures can be broadly classiﬁed in Kernel Hangs (KHs) and Kernel Panics (KPs).
The former can occur in two cases. First, a KH is experienced when the kernel is blocked
in an inﬁnite loop, or it is waiting for an event that will never occur, and interrupts are
disabled. Hence, the system is completely stalled. In this case, both applications and
other software modules interacting with the kernel are no longer served. Second, KHs can
occur which do not cause the system to be completely blocked. In this case, one or more
applications are caused to be indeﬁnitely waiting for a given event, either in kernel- (i.e.,
the application waits for the completion of a stalled system call) or in user-space (i.e., the
application is misbehaving due to incorrect return values or other side-eﬀects of the system
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call API). KPs occur when the OS detects an internal fatal error from which it cannot safely
recover by means of hardware exceptions (e.g., when an invalid memory address is accessed
or when an hardware failure occur). In this case, a panic handler routine is called which is
in charge of providing diagnostic messages (e.g., a dump of the stack and CPU registers)
to the connected terminals, to allow post-mortem analysis. Then, the system is stopped to
prevent further damages as the system would be in an unstable, erroneous, state: a (manual
or automatic) reboot is the only way to resume system execution. Thus, the kernel is able
to notify such failures in most of the cases. Conversely, hangs are hardly ever notiﬁed by
the kernel itself, because the error state is not explicitly signaled by hardware exceptions,
hence they become the major concern.
3.4.2 Evaluation of kernel logging capabilities
Software faults have been injected into the kernel source code aiming to evaluate the logging
capabilities of the Linux OS. To be more clear, the ultimate aim of the performed injection
campaign is to evaluate to what extent the built-in logging mechanisms are able to provide
error notiﬁcations prior the kernel to fail.
By software fault, it is meant a software defect, which in fact corresponds to a bug into
the code. An error occurs if the fault is activated. It represents an erroneous state of
the system (e.g., a wrong value into a memory register) which can lead to a failure if it
propagates to the system interface, i.e. to the kernel interface with either external modules
or applications. As fault injection has been used recurrently throughout all this thesis, it
has been thoroughly faced in section 1.2.8.
Software Mutation (SM ) has been applied (i.e., faults have been injected into the kernel
source code directly, see section 1.2.8). This is mainly for the sake of representativeness,
as it is crucial to evaluate detection capabilities with respect to faults which are likely to
occur in practice. For this reason, the fault model is based on ﬁeld data, and it is realistic
in terms of what and where to inject. It has been achieved by analyzing several public
60
forums and newsgroups from where discussions about kernel hangs experienced by Linux
developers and skilled users have been selected. The analysis revealed that:
• inﬁnite waits on locks are by far the most frequent cause of hangs within the kernel.
Spinlocks (i.e., exclusive locks in which a CPU is in active waiting) are the most used
synchronization mean;
• Hangs are often due to threads within the kernel trying to acquire a lock which is
already held 2;
• Kernel subsystems can hang due to interrupts handling code, e.g., interrupts are
masked when the kernel is waiting for a device-driven event3;
• Kernel hang can be caused by wrong handling of a set of multiple locks, e.g., locks
related to page tables and memory areas should be both acquired to perform memory
management4;
• Defects can be due to wrong assumptions about locks held when executing a piece of
code, e.g., a function should not be called without prior holding a speciﬁc lock5.
From these observations, a fault library has been designed consisting of the following classes:
• Missing release of a spinlock got before, e.g., within a function (F1 );
• Locking of two or more spinlocks in reverse order; this can result into a so-called
‘A-B-B-A’ deadlock situation (F2 );
• Missing unlock/lock operations on a spinlock within a given piece of code (F3 );
• Interrupts re-enabling omission when exiting a critical section in which they were
disabled (F4 ).
2http://lwn.net/Articles/261271
3http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/286491, http://lwn.net/Articles/138165
4http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.mm/16003, http://lwn.net/Articles/130160
5http://lwn.net/Articles/274292
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The fault library has been realized both by omitting some pieces of kernel code, and by
modifying it in several points. This is to emulate missing and wrong constructs, which have
been demonstrated to account for the majority of actual faults [1].
Representativeness in terms of “where” to injects, has been achieved by proﬁling the invo-
cations of the functions which make use of spinlocks; this required to instrument the kernel.
Then, faults have been injected into those primitives for that, during the execution of a
workload (i) a given spinlock has been acquired more than 1000 times and (ii), a spinlock
has been contended by other CPUs more than 100 times. This way it is quite likely to
induce kernel hangs. However, the kernel code which is executed during a given experiment
may vary, depending on the workload. For this reason, such a proﬁling has to be repeated
prior to chose fault locations, for each workload.
3.4.3 Kernel logging deﬁciencies
Synthetic workloads, which are representative of the most common operations in the con-
text of long running mission critical applications, has been used. Filebench 6, i.e., an
Open Source suite for measuring and comparing ﬁlesystems performances, has been used
to pursue this issue. Three diﬀerent workloads encompassed by the suite have been used
for experiments: (i)Varmail (W1), which emulates a Network File System mail server (ii),
Fileserver (W2) which performs a sequence of ﬁle system operations (create, delete, ap-
pend...) and (iii), Oltp (W3) which is a database emulator. This sounds reasonable in
that the most common operations performed in mission critical scenarios fall within these
categories, e.g., ﬂight data plan exchanges in Air Traﬃc Control systems.
An experimental campaign has been conducted on a computer equipped with 2 Xeon 2.8GHz
processors, 5Gb of RAM, and a 36 Gb SCSI hard disk (10000 RPM). Kernel version 2.6.25
6http://www.solarisinternals.com/wiki/index.php/FileBench
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has been used, and workloads have been generated by using Filebench version 1.647. Dy-
namic probing has been used to monitor procedures execution and to inject faults by the
means of KProbes and SystemTap tools (see details in section 3.5.3). Results in Figure 3.2
show that Linux mechanisms failed to detect hangs to signiﬁcant extent. About the 25% of
injected faults, resulted in KHs which have not been detected by the kernel. With respect
to the metrics deﬁned in section 3.2, this means that the kernel exhibited a coverage equal
to 75%. This is a worrying result, that could be not tolerable in critical scenarios. Hence, a
Figure 3.2: OS hang detection coverage. The 25% of the KHs has not been detected by the
Linux kernel.
detection algorithm has been proposed in this thesis, which is able to improve the detection
performances of the native Linux OS logging mechanisms, with respect to kernel hangs.
3.4.4 An algorithm for improving kernel hang detection
The algorithm is based on the continuous monitoring of the kernel I/O operations rate and
it has been designed by taking in mind: (i) to keep the overhead low, and (ii) to propose a
solution which is easy to be implemented.
7http://www.cs.rice.edu/~gulati/
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By observing disk and network I/O throughput values, the algorithm is able to detect the
presence of a failure in the system. I/O operations have been already used as a detection
mean in several studies coming from diﬀerent research ﬁelds [83, 84]. The results achieved
by these works make reasonable to claim that monitoring the I/O operations rate can be
very helpful into the detection of KHs, as experiments conﬁrm (see section 3.4.5).
Failure free executions of a given workload into the target system exhibit a regular I/O
operations rate, i.e., the number of I/O operations per second (throughput, th) ranges within
an interval, I = [I−, I+]. This models the normal behavior of the system, and we assume
deviations from such behavior as the symptom of a failure. As for example, if a thread
is blocked due to a deadlock, the I/O operations it would have executed normally are not
performed, thus inducing a th loss. Although this is a general statement, values for I, i.e., its
lower and upper bounds, are strongly related to the running workload. Additionally, even
in steady workloads (i.e., statistical characterization of I/O operations does not signiﬁcantly
change over time), ﬂuctuations due to secondary factors, e.g., a temporary overload, can
lead to th samples misinterpreted as failures (false positives). In fact, the proper deﬁnition
of [I−, I+] is the key to discriminate normal workload executions from anomalous ones.
To get a correct deﬁnition of I , running workload has been modeled as a random process
X, and by using a counter, C, which takes into account the duration of the th variation.
More precisely, a parametric model of the workload is proposed, which is based on the
computation of its ﬁrst order statistics, i.e., the statistical average (mX), and the standard
deviation (σX). The workload is supposed to be a stationary random process, i.e., mX
and σX do not signiﬁcantly change over time (i.e., for a long execution period). Real data
from the ﬁeld conﬁrm that this is a reasonable assumption for long running and near-real
time applications. Indeed, traﬃc data related to a Flight Data Plans (FDP) manager have
been collected and analyzed, within the framework of an industrial collaborations with
Selex-SI 8, a leading European company in the context of ATC. Data refer to the ﬂight
8COSMIC Project, http://www.cosmiclab.it
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traﬃc at the Neapolitan Airport within a day9; statistical analysis pointed out that FDP
management operations, as well as the number of departing and landing ﬂights, exhibit ﬁrst
order statistic which do not signiﬁcantly vary during 6 hours time slots, during daytime and
the evening (see Table 3.1). A further example comes from Oracle DataBase Management
Systems 10, for which it has been observed a stationary aggregate behavior in several long
running applications.
In order to model the normal behavior of the target application, the algorithm has to
Table 3.1: Flight Data exhibit a stationary behavior within a day (30 days, excluding the nights).
MEAN
TIME INTERVAL ARRIVALS DEPARTURES OPERATIONS
06:00-12:00 A.M. 32.776 31.611 64.388
12:00 06:00 P.M. 37.278 39.111 76.386
06:00 12:00 P.M. 34.943 32.555 67.523
STD. DEV. 2.251 4.085 6.222
be tuned properly. By running the workload in failure free conditions, mX and σX are
computed, as well as the threshold values k+, k−. An upper bound, for C, i.e., the threshold
values C (see equation 3.1), is also tuned as follows:
y =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if X(t) > mX and |X(t)−mX | > k
+σX
1 if X(t) < mX and |X(t)−mX | < k
−σX
0 otherwise
(3.1)
During the operational phase of the system, th is periodically sampled by the detection al-
gorithm, which compares each sample, X(t), to the precomputed mX . The failure detection
is performed in two steps. First, it has to be established whether the licit range for normal
th variation has been exceeded (equation 3.1). Second, short-time deviations are ﬁltered
out in order to take into account licit workload ﬂuctuations, due to secondary factors. The
threshold values k+ and k− deﬁne the licit range for th variations (they have to be set in
9Data comes from an industrial collaboration with SICTA Consortium, http://www.sicta.it
10http://www.nyoug.org/Presentations/SIG/DBA/dbasig\_wlc1.pdf
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order to minimize false positives). The second step is performed by using the C counter,
which is incremented if the samples signiﬁcantly diﬀers from the average. Otherwise, its
value is reset to zero. In other words, C=C+1 if y=1; C=0 otherwise. A failure is actually
detected, when C > C. Note that (i) C has to be tuned preliminarily and (ii), that we use
k−σX and k
+σX to indicate the above mentioned bounds I
−, I+. This is to explicitly take
into account variations from mX , i.e., the standard deviation.
Discussion. The hypotheses of a stationary workload has a limited validity. It can be
relaxed to encompass workloads whose ﬁrst order statistics change over time. This could be
done by proﬁling the workload preliminarily, and by using a more complex model, such as a
Hidden Markov Model (HMM). In this case, mX and σX could be estimated for each sam-
ple, rather than using the same value for all the samples. Additionally, the HMM should be
trained with respect to the th samples collected during the training phase. Then, depending
on the state, diﬀerent values for C and for the thresholds have to be enforced. Of course,
this generalized version would require a greater implementation eﬀort, and it is very likely
to increase the overhead [85].
3.4.5 Results
In order to evaluate to what extent the proposed algorithm was able to improve detection
quality, with respect to the metrics deﬁned in section 3.2, it has been run under the workload
described in section 3.4.3, in the same experimental conditions. As shown in Figure 3.3,
it has been able to detect about the 94% of the hangs, thus exhibiting better coverage if
compared to the native Linux mechanisms (which detected only the 75% of the faults). This
holds both with respect to single workloads and to the entire set of experiments.
Table 3.2 summarizes the coverage values with respect to fault classes. The best results
have been achieved with respect to classes F1 and F2, which are easier to detect (e.g.,
by means of a check into the function acquiring the lock) if compared to the other classes
which are related to more complex situations, e.g., interrupts masking. As for detection
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Figure 3.3: Detection algorithm coverage
Table 3.2: Coverage with respect to fault class and workloads
W1 W2 W3 ALL
F1 92,86% 100,00% 100,00% 97,62%
F2 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00%
F3 33,33% 33,33% 50,00% 37,50%
F4 50,00% 36,36% 44,44% 43,75%
Type Coverage
latency, Figure 3.4 reports to the distribution of detection latency with respect to the built-
in kernel detection mechanisms. Most of the hangs have been detected promptly once the
faulty portion of code has been executed (within 1ms.). However, there is a percentage of
failures which have been detected in a long time (up to 1s.). This is due to the fact that
the consistency control code execution may be delayed by the kernel. Furthermore, some
detection mechanisms are based on timeouts which can also be very long. Thus, detection
latency exhibited by kernel mechanisms cannot be easily predicted. By means of the pro-
posed algorithm, instead, it is allowed to identify an upper bound for the detection latency.
This is because hangs are persistent, hence they are eventually detected by the count and
threshold mechanism implemented by C. However, latency value depends on the sample
period for I/O rate, as well as on the C value with respect to the speciﬁc workload.
C also impacts on detection quality. On the one hand, the greater its value, the better the
accuracy (i.e., the lower the number of false positives). Figure 3.5 reports how accuracy
depends on C, with respect to each workload. On the other hand, the higher C, the longer
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Figure 3.4: Latency distributions of standard logging mechanisms
W1
96,00%
96,50%
97,00%
97,50%
98,00%
98,50%
99,00%
99,50%
100,00%
0 1 2 3 4
C
A
cc
ur
ac
y
Reads
Writes
W2
40,00%
50,00%
60,00%
70,00%
80,00%
90,00%
100,00%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
C
A
cc
ur
ac
y
Serie1
Serie2
W3
40,00%
50,00%
60,00%
70,00%
80,00%
90,00%
100,00%
0 1 2 3 4 5
C
A
cc
ur
ac
y
Reads
Writes
Figure 3.5: Accuracy with respect to the C threshold for each workload
the latency. Hence, a good trade oﬀ has to be achieved between detection latency and
accuracy. The accuracy follows a similar trend in all workloads (i.e., accuracy > 90%) for
C ≥ 3, therefore the algorithm provided good performances for a ﬁxed set of parameters
(C, k+, k−). It is worth noting that C has no impact on the coverage (once again due to
the persistent nature of KHs).
As for overhead, achieved results are summarized in Table 3.3. The two detection mech-
anisms have been compared both in terms of workload operations per second, and of the
amount of data which is read/written to the disks. More in detail, Δ indicates the gap be-
tween the two executions of the workloads, and it has been measured with respect to each
workload. It can be argued that the overhead does not exceed the 5%, even in the worst
case. However, the diﬀerence between averages is always lower than the standard deviation,
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Table 3.3: Algorithm overhead
Built-in det Algorithm Δ Built-in det Algorithm Δ
W1 137,88±30,62 131,66±47,14 -4.51% 0,270±0,064 0,280±0,098 3.70%
W2 818,89±6,11 810,37±5,37 -1.04% 3,389±0,031 3,333±0,047 -1.65%
W3 1901,19±27,56 1880,45±45,99 -1.09% 6,067±0,105 5,990±0,158 -1.27%
Ops/s MB/s
hence diﬀerences are probably due to statistical ﬂuctuations during the experiments. Better
results for overhead would have been achieved by using static probing.
3.4.6 Lessons learned
From the above discussed results it can be pointed out that:
1. The detection mechanism provided by the Linux OS reveals some deﬁciencies which
could not be tolerated in mission and safety critical applications, as well as in business
critical systems. This conﬁrms the intuition that direct, log-based, techniques are not
the best way to perform detection in these systems. The proposed algorithm revealed
to provide a better quality, hence it can be eﬀectively used as an additional detection
mean.
2. The algorithm has been able to detect kernel hangs, with high quality. Hence, it should
be used in the context of a more complex detection system addressing a broader failure
model (see section 3.7).
3. Performances of the proposed algorithm are strongly inﬂuenced by the tuning, as well
as by the running workload.
3.5 Detection system architecture
This section illustrates the general architecture of the detection system, realized to detect
application failures, due to software faults, in OTS based complex and critical systems, by
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leveraging the OS support. Here, the basic principle and ideas are discussed. Its speciﬁc
application to (i) the detection of application hangs and (ii) the detection of errors in a
location oriented perspective, which is the base for the DLR framework, will be described
in the next sections. The basic idea is to indirectly inferring the health of the monitored
DU by observing its behavior and interactions with the external environment. As stated
in section 2.2, OS processes are the target of detection. Hence, since they continuously
interact with the external environment (e.g., by means of system calls, signals...), this is
particularly eﬀective.
The intuition behind such an approach, which diﬀerentiates it from the most of the ap-
proaches which have already been proposed, is to leverage OS support to detect upper level
failures (e.g., application failures), thus moving down the observation point of view. This
way, it is allowed to (i) detect user level failures due to OS faults, and (ii) to have a more
complete information set for performing diagnosis.
The overall detection system architecture is depicted in Figure 3.6. It is a modular, plug-
gable, architecture made up of several OS level monitors (Mi, ∀i = 1...n) whose responses,
named alarms, are combined in order to detect provide a global detection response. This
allow to cover a higher number of errors, as well as to gain a better accuracy, if compared
to single monitors. Let P the number of DUs, i.e., processes, within the monitored ap-
plication. As monitors are associated to each thread tj running in the context of the P
processes, they account for a total of P x tjk ∀k = 1..n, where n is the number of monitored
parameters. The basic idea behind this architecture has been gathered by the anomaly
detection paradigm: monitors trigger an alarm if the monitored parameter value deviates
from a range of licit values ri = [r
−
i , r
+
i ], which has to be set up during a preliminary
training phase. The monitored parameters, and the related ranges, depend on the nature of
the application being controlled. More speciﬁcally, monitors evaluate a triggering condition
periodically, with a period equal to T . An alarm generator (ai) collects the output of all
the monitors related to the parameter n for the i− th process, then it increments a counter,
70
Figure 3.6: Detection architecture.
named c, if a given thread veriﬁes the triggering condition. The truth of triggering condi-
tions is established by comparing the values of monitored parameters with those modeled
as normal: they are “anomalous” if they fall outside the licit range. In other words, if the
monitored value n for a given parameter p does fall outside ri within a temporal window T ,
the alarm is triggered. The output of each ai is thus a variable, named Fi whose deﬁnition
varies depending on the speciﬁc detection strategy (see the following sections).
A similar approach, conﬁrming the intuition that better results could be achieved by combin-
ing several monitors, has been proposed in [13], where a model-based approach is followed.
As previously mentioned, this architecture has been used in this thesis (i) for detecting
applications hang failures in critical systems and (ii) in the context of the overall DLR
framework, where the detection is the crucial input for the location, and then the recovery,
of software faults. In particular, the Fi computation, and the global detection function have
been specialized to be tailored for the speciﬁc case. Details are described in section 3.6 and
section 3.7, respectively.
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3.5.1 Parameters and detection criteria
The following OS data, which are easy to collect and analyze with a low computational
overhead, have been monitored to describe DUs behavior:
1. SIGNALS, i.e., notiﬁcations produced by the OS when providing services to the appli-
cation (e.g., numeric return codes returned by system calls, UNIX signals). Erroneous
OS notiﬁcations are logged (e.g., return codes diﬀerent than zero, which represent ex-
ceptional conditions and are relatively rare);
2. TIME EVENTS, i.e., the occurrence time of events on which the application relies
(e.g., the time in which an OS resource is available to the application, e.g., a semaphore
or a network packet). A log entry is produced when timeouts are exceeded, i.e., if such
events do not occur within a given interval (e.g., timeout for semaphores availability);
3. THROUGHPUT, i.e., the amount of data exchanged by OS processes through I/O
facilities (e.g., the throughput of network and disk devices). Upper and lower bounds
are associated with the I/O throughput; throughput is periodically sampled, and a
log entry is produced when bounds are exceeded. The detection algorithm, described
in section 3.4.4, has been used to monitor these data. It has been slightly improved
to pursue this issue, as it will be described in section 3.5.2.3.
3.5.2 The monitors
The detection system has been implemented to be compliant with a POSIX operating
system. In particular, we developed it under the Linux OS, and the following monitors
have been implemented for controlling the detection parameters (p = 7) described in section
3.5.1.
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3.5.2.1 Time related monitors
• Waiting time on semaphores. The delay between time in which a task 11 requests
for a semaphore and the time the semaphore is actually acquired, for each semaphore
and task. An exceeded timeout can be symptom of a deadlock between the threads
within a process, or between several processes on the same node.
• Holding time on semaphores. The delay between the time in which the task has
acquired a semaphore and the time the semaphore is released is measured for each
semaphore and task. An exceeded timeout can be due to a process blocked within a
critical section.
• Task schedulation timeout. The delay between the preemption of a task (e.g., when
its time slice is exhausted and the CPU is granted to another task), and the next
schedulation of the same task is measured for each task. This way, blocked tasks due
to indeﬁnite wait can be detected. For example, the block can be due to a task fault,
or to the stall of the overall application (hence, not only to deadlocks).
• Send/receive timeout on a socket. The delay between two consecutive packets sent on
a given socket (both from and to the monitored task) is measured, for each task and
socket. This allows to detect stop and omission failures of a task.
3.5.2.2 Signals related monitors
• UNIX system calls, UNIX signals. Applications use system calls are to make requests
to the OS (e.g., access to hardware devices, process communication, etc.). In UNIX
systems, each system call can return a given set of codes which reﬂect exceptions when
the system call exits prematurely. Error codes may be both due to hardware faults
and to application misbehaviors (e.g., unavailable ﬁle or socket is accessed). Similarly,
11A thread in the Linux jargon
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signals are used by the OS to notify exceptional events which are not related to a
system call (e.g., memory denied memory access).
• Task lifecycle. The events of allocation and the termination of a task and its descen-
dants are monitored. In fact, when a task terminates, either voluntarily or forcedly,
it is deallocated by the OS, and an error code is returned to the parent process; a
common rule is to return a non null code in the case of an error.
3.5.2.3 Throughput monitor
This monitor takes into account performance failures which may aﬀect the application.
It has been developed by means of an improved version of the algorithm described in
section 3.4.4. In fact, when the application is running in degraded mode (e.g., due to
resource exhaustion or overloading), it can be observed an anomalous amount of data (either
too low, loss, or too high, peak) produced or consumed by tasks. In order to keep the
overhead low, the detection algorithm is very simple and it is based on upper and lower
bounds for the I/O transfer rate. Bytes read from and written to disks, and sent to and
received from network devices were taken into account. Disk and network operations (both
in input and output) within the kernel are probed, and the amount of bytes transferred
within a second is periodically sampled (we refer to a sample as X(t)). The bounds applied
to each metric have to be chosen conservatively (i.e., out-of-bound samples are rare during
normal operation), in order to reduce the amount of false positives and still detect the stall of
a task. A conceivable way to choose the bounds is to proﬁle the task for a long time period,
and to establish the bounds on ﬁrst-order statistics (i.e., mean and standard deviation)
of I/O samples. Diﬀerent implementations of the algorithm are described in the following
sections, with respect to the two cases in which they have been applied. Monitors, which
are summarized in Table 3.4, have been implemented by means of dynamic probing : the
execution ﬂow of the OS is interrupted when speciﬁc instructions are executed (similarly
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to breakpoints in debuggers), and ad-hoc routines are invoked to collect data about the
execution (i.e., to analyze OS resource usage by monitored applications). Note that dynamic
probing was only used for measurement and detection purposes, and no attempt is made to
modify kernel and processes execution. Furthermore, simultaneous failures of the monitors
Mi, i.e., the events of producing false alarms at the same time, are assumed to occur rarely.
This detection approach reveals to be less intrusive that traditional techniques, such as
Table 3.4: Monitors performing detection.
Monitor Triggering condition Parameters Domain
UNIX system An error code Window length Syscalls × ErrCodes
calls is returned
UNIX signals A signal is received Window length Signals
by the task
Task schedulation Timeout exceeded Timeout value [0,∞]
timeout (since the task is preempted)
Waiting time Timeout exceeded Timeout value [0,∞]
on semaphores (since the task begins to wait)
Holding time Timeout exceeded Timeout value [0,∞]
in critical sections (since the task acquires a lock)
Task lifecycle Task allocation or Window length lifecycle event
termination
I/O throughput Bound exceeded for Threshold C [0,∞]
C consecutive samples
Send/receive Timeout exceeded Timeout value [0,∞]
timeout on a socket (since a packet is sent over a socket)
those based on heartbeat, which also require extra code to be written at application level,
and which may fail in the case of multithreaded applications. Additionally, the proposed
approach is able to exploit OS information which would be not available if remote detection
were performed: as for example, it allows to discern the nature of a process stuck (i.e.,
deadlock, I/O waiting...).
3.5.3 Technical Issues
Dynamic probing allows to gather useful information related to system problems in a real
environment, e.g., page-manager bugs in the kernel, as well as user or system problems that
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are not easy to reproduce in either a lab or production environment. As the system as
been implemented in the Linux OS environment, the probing has been realized by means
of the Kprobes framework 12. It is a simple and lightweight mechanism that enables the
insertion of breakpoints into a running kernel. Kprobes provides an interface to break into
any kernel routine and collect information from the interrupt handler non-disruptively. It
also allows to collect debugging information, such as processor registers and global data
structures. More precisely, a probe is inserted by dynamically writing breakpoint instruc-
tions at a given address in the running kernel. Execution of the probed instruction results
in a breakpoint fault. Kprobes hooks into the breakpoint handler and collects debugging
information.
When implementing the detection system, breakpoints have been placed in the kernel func-
tions related to the detection parameters. Once the breakpoint is hit, a handler routine is
executed just before the kernel code, in order to collect data quickly (e.g., input parameters
or return values). This does not introduce any interferences on correct program execution,
except for a very short delay.
The complete detection system has been implemented as a loadable kernel module, by
means of the SystemTap tool13. It allows to program breakpoint handlers by means of a
high-level scripting language; SystemTap scripts are then translated into C code.
Synchronization issues between threads have been tricky to be monitored. Indeed, tracing
the kernel code is not enough for providing a complete view of all the lock/unlock opera-
tions on shared resources. For this reason a shared library has been implemented to wrap
PThread API provided by the standard glibc library which, in fact, overloads the PThread
functions to be monitored.
The experienced delays in program executions when using KProbes and SystemTap have
not been signiﬁcant, i.e., they do not cause sensible overhead. In particular the overall
12http://sources.redhat.com/systemtap/kprobes/index.html
13http://sourceware.org/systemtap/
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execution time of the application and the time to completion of a single remote method in
the absence and in the presence of the detector have been compared . The overall execution
time has not been inﬂuenced by the detector, since it is mostly dependent on other random
factors, such as network delay. As for the time to completion of a single remote method,
an average 2.35% overhead due to the detector has been experienced.
3.6 The OS support to detect application hangs
Application hangs can be both active, i.e., hangs that occur when the process is still running
(i.e., one of its threads, if any, consumes CPU cycles), but its activity is no longer perceived
by other processes and by the user, or passive, i.e., hangs that occur when the process (or
one of its threads) is indeﬁnitely blocked, e.g., it waits for shared resources that will never
be released. In complex systems it is hard to tell whether a thread is currently subject to
a passive hang, or it is deliberately blocked waiting for some work to be performed (e.g.,
this happens when pools of threads are used in multi-threaded server processes). According
to the classiﬁcation proposed in [15], a given application can fail due to halt failures, i.e.,
failures which cause the delivered service to be halted and the external state of the service
to be constant. Crash failures also belong to this class, i.e., a DUs is crashed when the
process terminates unexpectedly (e.g., due to run-time exceptions). Even if crashes can
be considered as the most severe failures, their detection is fairly simple to be performed
locally, since the process structure associated with the DUs is deallocated when the process
crashes. This is the why hang detection is the focus of this part of the thesis. In fact, is
it not so simple to detect these failures. By means of preliminary studies conducted on a
few safety critical systems, e.g., the CARDAMOM middleware (see Appendix A), it has
been shown that they were not so robust to application hangs. In other words, even the
middleware built-in logging mechanisms were not able to notify the presence of hangs. This
has been conﬁrmed by an experimental campaign aiming to perform a robustness test of the
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Figure 3.7: Hang failures which escaped the built-in middleware detection mechanisms
middleware, and of the Fault Tolerance service it provides. Table 3.7 reports a summary
of the achieved results, as well as of the experiments setup. It can be argued that the
middleware built-in detection mechanisms have been not able to detect the presence of an
hang into the server, thus not serving the clients’ requests. This is because the server was
hang but it was able to respond to the heartbeat anyway.
For this reason a detection system has been realized to support the detection of these
failures in complex and safety critical systems. This has been conceived as a self-containing
detection system, hence without diagnosis in mind. In this case the following issues have
to be pointed out to clarify the speciﬁc architecture realization:
1. The speciﬁc architecture scheme is depicted in Figure 3.8. An oracle (O) has been used
to compare detected failures and the normal behavior of the system. The feedback
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Figure 3.8: Scheme of the detection system
branch refers to tunable parameters which could be retrained during system lifetime
dynamically. This system is intended for performing failure detection, and it is not
going to be integrated with other systems. This is the reason for which the architec-
ture is slightly more complicated than the one depicted in section 3.5. Training and
feedback are performed within the system itself; the same holds for the oracle.
2. The output of the global detection, d, has been calculated by means of a weighted
sum:
d =
∑
i=1...n
wi · Fi (3.2)
where Fi is deﬁned as:
Fi =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
−1 if n /∈ ri in T
1 otherwise
(3.3)
More precisely, let t(k) be the time of the k − th measurement. T(k) is the temporal
window containing the measurement, as depicted in Figure 3.9. This windowing
technique aims to minimize false positives in the detection process: if the number of
times that n /∈ ri within T(k) falls outside ri, an alarm is signaled. A similar approach
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is a common in the context of intrusion detection studies, where n-grams are used to
extract regular patterns from traces (the number of alarms is used instead of a time
interval [77, 79]).
Tk
Alarms
Sliding window
t(k)
Figure 3.9: Windowing technique to discriminate anomalies
Actual values for each ri have to be preliminary tuned during the training phase
(see the Trainer block in the Figure 3.8). The training is performed by analyzing
both normal and faulty runs of the system. It is worth noting that, even in normal
executions of the system, anomalous values could appear due to the complexity of
the applications we are addressing, e.g., a certain number of threads in a thread
pool might be blocked, waiting for being activated; the long waiting time is thus not
pathologic in this case. These anomalies are ruled out by the training phase, during
which appropriate ranges are established for each monitor.
The weights, wi, have been assigned to the monitors as in equation 3.4:
wi =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
ai if Fi = 1
ci if Fi = −1
(3.4)
This allows to take into account monitors detection capabilities: ai and ci are re-
spectively the accuracy and the coverage measured for each monitor. Hence, in the
weighted sum, positive contributions (each of them equals to ai) are due to monitors
which trigger alarms. On the contrary, negative contributions (each of them equals
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to ci) are due to monitors claiming the absence of anomalies. The proposed heuristic
is quite simple to calculate, hence it is computationally eﬃcient if compared to data
mining or statistical classiﬁcation techniques.
A failure is ﬁnally detected if d in equation 3.2 exceeds a given threshold t. The
threshold is set during the training phase in order to be never exceeded during normal
runs. Of course, its value can be re-tuned during system lifetime: this justiﬁes the
feedback in Figure 3.8. The oracle, O, is responsible for supervising the training and
for evaluating ai and ci for each Mi and αi.
3. The socket monitor has not been used in this case, as it was not helpful in this case.
3.6.1 Application hangs detection
The monitor periodically samples the rate of I/O operations, then the computed sample
value is compared to the statistical mean. If a given bound is exceeded (see equation 3.5),
i.e., if the samples value signiﬁcantly diﬀers from the average, a given counter, namely C is
incremented. On the contrary, if the bound is not exceeded, C is reset to zero.
y =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
|X(t)−mX | > k
+σX if X(t) > mX
|X(t)−mX | > k
−σX if X(t) < mX
(3.5)
In the previous equation, X(t) represents the I/O sample at time t, whereas mX and
σX represent, respectively, the precomputed mean and standard deviation values. Normal
ﬂuctuations around the mean have to be taken into account by properly tuning k+ and
k−. These thresholds have to be set in order to minimize false positives. For this reason,
it is desirable to not have false positives when training the monitor, i.e., during normal
executions of the workload (see Figure 3.10a). If this is not achievable (see Figure 3.10b),
thresholds have to be set to ﬁlter out outliers, i.e., I/O samples which signiﬁcantly diﬀers
from the statistical mean.
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Figure 3.10: I/O operations rate
The C counter plays a key role in alarm triggering. During normal executions, a threshold
value C has to be deﬁned which, if exceeded, causes a warning to be triggered. This
threshold is introduced to ﬁlter short-time deviations from the mean value, which normally
occur during workload executions. In order to encompass longer deviations (e.g., long I/O
bursts ), a more complex model should be deﬁned (e.g., by using Hidden Markov Models
to characterize several system states; the same approach can be used on these states with
diﬀerent bounds and C thresholds).
3.6.2 Experimental framework
3.6.2.1 Testbed and workload
The case study comes from the real world; it is a CARDAMOM application, exploiting
Fault Tolerance and Load Balancing facilities provided by the middleware. The application
implements a system in charge of updating ﬂight data plans. Clients forward update requests
to a facade process, that is replicated by means of CARDAMOM fault tolerance facilities,
and which forwards them to several processing servers, conﬁgured as a load balancing group.
These are in charge of performing perform the actual data plans update; the facade collects
server responses and informs the clients that the request has been served. Communications
between processes are performed by means of a Data Distribution System (DDS).
The application is deployed on three nodes of a cluster of computers; each node is equipped
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Figure 3.11: Outcomes of the injection experiments
with a Intel Xeon processor and with 4Gb of RAM memory.
3.6.2.2 Fault injection campaigns
Software Mutation has been used also in this case for injecting faults. The application source
code has been corrupted according to the injection framework described in [1]. Faults have
been injected both into the facade and one processing server (pserver in the following),
accounting for a total number of 88 injections (72 faults into the facade, the others in the
pserver). Injected faults resulted in diﬀerent failures according to the percentages reported
in Figure 3.11. “Wrong” means that erratic failures occurred which are not considered in
this work. However, they account for the minority of the observed failures. “OK” means
instead that the injected fault did not result in a failure.
Results
The approach has been evaluated in terms of accuracy and coverage metrics (see section 3.2).
Tunable parameters have been trained empirically. Both timeout values for semaphores
waiting times and tasks schedulation have been set to 1s., such as the I/O sampling rate
and the sliding window length. Results show that the overall approach is robust with respect
to sub optimal choices of the tuning parameters; automatic training should be done to set
them optimally. Table 3.5 shows accuracy and coverage values for each monitor and with
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respect to injection target processes (namely facade and pserver). Performances of single
monitors diﬀers signiﬁcantly. The I/O throughput monitor exhibits better accuracy and
coverage for both the processes, if compared to other monitors. Conversely, the holding
times on critical sections shows diﬀerent coverage with respect to the monitored process
(0% for the facade, and 89.66% for the pserver). Hence, it is important to have multiple
monitors, since their performance can be inﬂuenced by the monitored process. The same
Table 3.5: Coverage and accuracy experienced for each monitor.
Monitor ci facade ci pserver ai facade ai pserver
I/O throughput 100% 100% 90.74% 66.67%
Task Schedulation Timeout 83.33% 75.86% 61.11% 57.41%
Waiting times on semaphores 25% 96.55% 77.77% 97.0%
Holding times for critical sections 0% 89.66% 81.48% 90.74%
OS Signals 8.33% 0% 100% 100%
System calls 8.33% 17.24% 97.0% 100%
Processes and threads exit codes 0% 0% 100% 94.44%
set of experiments used for Table 3.5 has been used to set the t threshold (see equation 3.2)
for both the processes. It is interesting to note that the threshold values were signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by the monitored process, i.e., it is t = −468 for the facade and t = −195 for the
pserver.
Table 3.6 shows results in terms of accuracy and coverage for the global detection. They
(cglobal and aglobal respectively) are reported in Table 3.6 and conﬁrm that the combination
of multiple monitors improves the overall detection quality. Speciﬁcally, the global detection
is able to preserve the good coverage result of the I/O throughput monitor, while minimiz-
ing the number of false positives, hence improving the overall accuracy. For instance, with
reference to the pserver process, using only an I/O throughput-based detector would have
led to the same high coverage result. Nevertheless, the accuracy value would have been
lower (i.e., ai = 66.67%) than in the case of the global detector (aglobal=100%).
This result is achieved despite the empirical training of tunable parameters, which is ap-
proximative.
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Table 3.6: Global coverage and accuracy
Monitor cglobal cglobal aglobal aglobal
(facade) (pserver) (facade) (pserver)
Global Detector 100% 100% 96.15% 100%
3.6.3 Lesson learned and possible improvements
The detection of application hangs has been performed with good results by means of the
proposed architecture. However, there is still much work to be done in terms of monitors
to plug into the scheme, as well as on the global detection heuristic. Of course a good trade
oﬀ has to be found between performances and computational overhead. Even if the one
proposed here exhibits good behavior, further solutions should be investigated, even with
respect to diﬀerent target systems. As a general conclusion, as it will be also conﬁrmed in
the next Chapter with respect to the overall DLR framework, the idea of combining multiple
detection sources is quite eﬀective. It allows to get the most of each single monitor, thus
preserving accuracy and coverage. Finally, the idea of monitoring I/O throughput has
been demonstrated to be eﬀective also for detecting application failures, beyond that kernel
hangs.
3.7 A novel diagnosis-oriented idea of detection
The idea of integrating detection into the diagnosis process lead to a radical upset of the
traditional detection approaches. Their ultimate aim was to optimize detection accuracy,
i.e., the percentage of events detected correctly, at design time, in order to let the detectors
exhibit the minimum number of false alarms once on the ﬁeld. This is a very eﬀective
approach if a complete, or at least broad, knowledge of the events to detect is available.
When performing error detection in hardware systems, such an hypothesis sounds rea-
sonable, and the approach reveals eﬀective. In fact, these systems can be aﬀected by a
restricted number of faults which are easy to detect, and to repair as well (e.g., bit ﬂips
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or stuck-at-value). Additionally, these faults are likely to have a transient nature (e.g., a
sudden temperature peak) hence, if signaled not properly, they could induce unnecessary
actions on the system (e.g., the isolation of the component believed as faulty). Thus, they
have to be discriminated.
Conversely, when only a reduced set of detectable events is known, a similar approach can
be even counterproductive. In fact, it would cause some events to go unnoticed, even being
related to faulty conditions. This is especially true in the case of complex software systems,
for which the presence of residual faults, mainly Heisenbugs, exacerbates this issue. If they
were discriminated, in the same way as hardware transient faults, their consequences could
not be tolerated at all. This is what has to be avoided in a recovery oriented diagnosis
perspective, such as DLR. The aim of this section is to propose a novel detection strategy
in charge of supporting the location, and then the diagnosis, of software faults in complex
and OTS based critical systems.
Let F be the set of events (faults, errors) which can aﬀect the system. Let it be the union
of two subsets:
• K, i.e., the set of events which are known at design time;
• K, i.e., the set of faults which are not known at design time (potential residual faults,
if activated);
Hence, F =K∪K. Then, if D is the set of detected events and D the set of undetected
ones, it holds also that F ⊆ D ∪D, with respect to detection.
Traditional approaches assume K = ∅, hence detectors were designed so that D = ∅ as well.
Thus, their ultimate aim is to keep K = D at design time. In fact, the events in D − k
would be false positives.
Conversely, in the case of partial ignorance about the detectable events, it is K 	= ∅, and
D 	= ∅ consequently.
In Figure 3.12 the diﬀerence between the events encompassed by the detection is depicted.
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Green triangles in Figure 3.7 correspond to false positives. Known, and actual, faults, that
are ﬁgured in blue, are always detected to conﬁrm the complete awareness about the events
to detect.Figure 3.7, instead, encompasses the presence of both unknown (the red squares)
and undetected faults (the crosses). These two classes of events overlap, in that it is not
possible to detect something which is not recognized as a known event. In other words, they
correspond to false negatives, thus they have to be skilled oﬀ. The idea behind the detection
strategy proposed in this thesis, is the ability of detect even the presence of unknown events,
by keeping in mind the following goals:
• reduce the size of K ∩D always, i.e., to get maximum coverage;
• reduce the size of K −D over time, i.e., to get an accuracy function increasing with
time.
As shown in Figure3.13, this results in a subset of unknown events which are signaled any-
way, even if they cannot be completely characterized. A gross grain overview of the overall
approach which is proposed in this thesis has been provided in Chapter 2.
As already discussed there, the detection strategy proposed in the context of this work is
based on the machine learning paradigm, in the form of anomaly detection. The unknown
events which are signaled, are in fact deviations from a system behavior modeled as “nor-
mal”; however they could not be related to an actually faulty event.
In section 2.2 the system model and assumptions made in this thesis have been described.
According to the terminology used there, the detectable events are in fact “errors” in the
state of the system. The OS processes are the object of detection, and location as well
(DUs).
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(a) All the events are assumed to be known by traditional detection approaches
(b) Unknown events come up when transient software faults have to be faced
Figure 3.12: Diﬀerence between events in traditional and new approaches for detection.
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Figure 3.13: Unknown events which go unnoticed
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3.7.1 The detection architecture
The detection system designed in this thesis (see section 3.7) to detect application failures,
has been slightly modiﬁed to be integrated into a diagnosis engine. The following issues
have to be pointed out to clarify the changes:
1. The output of each ai is a binary variable deﬁned as:
Fi =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 if n /∈ rin in T
0 otherwise
(3.6)
Ranges ri are tuned during the training phase; their bounds correspond to the maxi-
mum and the minimum number of occurrences of the monitored events (the number
of events n is sampled periodically) experienced during faulty-free runs of the system.
2. The global detection response, has been achieved by means of the Bayes’ rule. The
probability of an error is achieved by:
P (F |a) =
P (a|F )P (F )
P (a|F )P (F ) + P (a|¬F )(1− P (F ))
(3.7)
The specialized version of the architecture of the detection system is depicted in
Figure3.14. An error is detected, i.e., a detection alarm is triggered, if the estimated
a posteriori probability exceeds a given threshold. In equation 3.7, F represents the
event “faulty DU”, and a is a vector containing the output of the alarm generators
αi: if Fi = 1 for L consecutive periods T , then ai = L, in order to take into account
the alarm duration and to ﬁlter out “transient” false alarms (i.e., alarms triggered for
only a short amount of time).
The joint probability distributions P (a|F ) and P (a|¬F ), i.e., the probability of detec-
tion and the probability of false alarms respectively [86], have to be estimated during
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Figure 3.14: Architecture of the location oriented detection system
the training phase. The former can be estimated using fault injection, by evaluat-
ing the number of occurrences of the a vector under faults, over the total number
of vectors collected during fault injection. Similarly, the latter can be estimated by
counting the number of occurrences of a during faulty-free executions. Finally, the a
priori fault probability P (F ) has to be known. Field data, if available, or statistical
characterization provided by the literature can be used to this aim.
3. All the monitors described in section 3.5.2 have been used.
3.7.2 I/O throughput monitoring for location oriented detection
In this case, the detection algorithm has been formulated as in equation 3.5. It can be
formulated more clearly as:
y =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if X(t) > mX and |X(t)−mX | > k
+σX
1 if X(t) < mX and |X(t)−mX | < k
−σX
0 otherwise
(3.8)
were mX and σX are the mean and the standard deviation of the proﬁled samples during the
training phase, k+ and k− are constants preliminary set by the user (greater constants will
lead to more conservative bounds). In order to take into account bursts and idle periods,
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a threshold C is chosen such that an error log entry is produced only if C consecutive out-
of-bound samples occurs; C can be set to the maximum length of the bursts or idle periods
occurred during the training phase.
3.7.3 Experimental campaigns
The eﬀectiveness of the detection approach described in section 3.7 has been evaluated again
by means of fault injection campaigns. However, to give the reader on overall picture of the
overall DLR framework, and of at what extent the proposed strategy helps the diagnosis of
software faults, details about the conducted experiments are delayed to the next chapter (see
section 5.5). There, a thorough description of experiments will be provided; both detection
and location results will be shown and discussed.
It is the mark of an educated mind to
rest satisﬁed with the degree of
precision which the nature of the
subject admits and not to seek
exactness where only an approximation
is possible.
AristotleChapter 4
Fault Location and Recovery
This chapter aims to illustrate the location strategy, in charge of locating the root cause of a failure
once an alarm has been triggered by the detection module. It is also able to improve detection
accuracy over time, by reducing the number of false positives through periodic feedback actions. The
problem has been addressed as a classiﬁcation problem, and recovery actions tailored for the particular
faults that occurred have been associated to each fault class. Details about the machine learning used
strategy, and about the adopted classiﬁers as well are provided.
4.1 The Location Strategy
In a diagnosis framework, the ultimate aim of location is to provide a fault candidate list,
i.e., to identify which faults can (potentially) be the cause of the experienced error/failure.
Obviously, the shorter the list, the better the location quality. As stated in chapter 2, the
location has been addressed in this thesis as a classiﬁcation problem.
The underlying approach has been gathered by the machine learning community, which
provides a generous literature, as stated in section 2.4. In particular, the approach proposed
in this thesis is close in spirit to several works focusing on diﬀerent problems, e.g., works
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focusing on document classiﬁcation [87, 88] or aiming to ﬁnd latent errors in software
programs [59].
To the best of author knowledge, similar approaches have not been applied so far to faults
diagnosis. Being the proposed approach oriented to system recovery, faults have been
associated to the best recovery action in charge of solving the problem experienced by the
system. The information related to a fault, have been translated into “features” that have
to be processed by the location classiﬁer (see section 4.2.2).
The basic idea is to associate recovery actions to each experienced fault, thus keeping the
classiﬁer aware of the most suitable recovery action to start in the case of actual faults. In
fact, for each DU in the system, injected faults are added to the training set, if unknown.
This is achieved by means of the training phase, which has been described in chapter 2. This
way, a base knowledge is built, even by exploiting human insights where they are available
(see chapter 2).
Support Vector Machines (SVMs) have been used for performing classiﬁcation. The high-
performance algorithm they rely on, has been commonly used across a wide range of text
classiﬁcation problems, and they reveal to be quite eﬀective for handling large datasets [89].
In this thesis, a variant of the SVM classiﬁer, named MPSVM 1, has been used. It is
able to provide a probability output indicating the level of belief related to the performed
classiﬁcation. These output probabilities have been leveraged to properly diagnose Unknown
Faults (see section 2.3), as well as to unmask detection of false positives (i.e., Suspected
Errors (SEs) in section 2.3). More precisely, a conﬁdence has been introduced, C, which
is in fact the maximum of the output probability vector provided by the classiﬁer. A
fault is claimed unknown if C is less than a given threshold, t. As for SEs, a special class of
faults, named “No Fault”, has been introduced: if the classiﬁer is conﬁdent that a given fault
belongs to this class, (i.e., C ≥ t), a SE is claimed. In this case, the monitor which triggered
the alarm is retrained by modifying the joint probability distributions in equation 3.7. In
1see details in section 4.2.1
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Figure 4.1: Diagnosis response wrt location output
this case, no recovery actions are initiated.
The choice of t strongly impacts on the diagnosis quality, hence a sensitivity analysis has
been performed for tuning it properly, as it will be detailed in section 5.5.
Figure 4.1 shows the ﬁnal diagnosis response with respect to the location output.
4.2 Machine Learning
The general problem of machine learning is to search a large space of potential hypotheses
to determine the one that will best ﬁt the data and any prior knowledge. Available data can
be labeled or unlabeled. In the former case, a supervised learning problem is being faced,
in that the true answer is known for a given set of data. A classiﬁcation problem holds
when the output function is a class, i.e., labels are divided into categories. Conversely, if
the output is a continuous function, a regression problem arises. In the latter case, instead,
labels are unknown and unsupervised learning has to be performed. The main aim is to
characterize the structure of the data, e.g. by identifying groups of examples in the data
that are collectively similar to each other and distinct from the other data.
In this thesis, the problem of fault location has been faced as a supervised learning problem,
in the form of classiﬁcation. According to supervised learning, some properties have to be
predicted, given some examples. If there are available a set of examples whose properties
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have already been characterized, the task is to learn the relationship between the properties
and the collected samples. The approach consists in presenting the examples to a learner
which makes a prediction of the property of interest. The correct answer is then presented
to the learner that adjusts its hypothesis, accordingly.
In order to solve a supervised learning problem, several steps have to be performed:
1. The nature of the training samples has to be established, with respect to the problem
to be solved;
2. A training set has to be gathered, which is representative of real world situations (it
may be achieved by ﬁeld data or human experts into the ﬁeld);
3. The representation function for the inputs features has to be determined; the better
the input objects representation the higher the accuracy of the learned function. Input
objects are usually transformed into a feature vector; a good trade oﬀ has to be found
between the number of features and the prediction accuracy.
4. The structure of the learned function, as well as the learning algorithm to be used (e,g.,
artiﬁcial neural networks or decision trees) have to be established. Then algorithm
parameters have to be tuned and validated on a diﬀerent set of samples (the validation
set).
Formally, the goal of the supervised learning is to learn a mapping h : X → Y from
structured inputs to structured response values, where the inputs and response values form
a dependency structure. For each input x, there is a set of feasible outputs, Y (x) ⊆ Y . It
is usually assumed that Y (x) is ﬁnite for all x ∈ X, which is the case in many real world
problems.
Active learning is a form of supervised learning which is used in the case that there is a lot
of unlabeled data which are expensive to be labeled. It is an iterative supervised learning
in which the learner queries the trainer for labels. Since the learner chooses the examples,
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the number of examples to learn a concept will be much lower than the number required
in normal supervised learning. Of course, there is a risk that the algorithm might focus on
unimportant or even invalid examples.
During each iteration, the set of samples T is broken up into three subsets:
• TK,i i.e., data points where the label is known;
• TU,i i.e., data points where the label is unknown;
• TC,i ⊆ TU,i, i.e., a subset of TU,i that is chosen for labeling.
The focus of research is on ﬁnding the best method to chose the data points for TC,i ⊆ TU,i.
Active learning is particularly suitable for solving web searching, e-mail ﬁltering, relevance
feedback, and protein recognition problems.
Most active learning algorithms are built upon SVMs, and they exploit SVM structure
to determine which data points have to be labeled. Such methods usually calculate the
margin, W , of each unlabeled data in TU,i; W is a n-dimensional distance from that datum
to the separating hyperplane. Datum with the smallest W are those that the SVM is most
uncertain about and therefore should be placed in TC,i to be labeled, according to the so-
called Minimum Margin Hyperplane methods.
SVMs are statistical classiﬁers which are adopted with signiﬁcant success in numerous
real-world learning tasks, such as document classiﬁcation [87], and speech recognition [90].
However, the trickiest issue when performing classiﬁcation is to select the strategy that is
the best for the given problem to get solved. This is because the performance of a given
classiﬁer strongly depend on the characteristics of the data to be classiﬁed, as well as on
the number of features. The main point is that diﬀerent classiﬁcation strategies can be
compared only by running empirical tests (e.g., the minimization of the empirical risk),
which are not always easy to be performed in practice. Besides SVMs, the most widely
used classiﬁers are the Neural Networks (Multi-layer Perceptron), k-Nearest Neighbors,
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Gaussian Mixture Model, Gaussian, Naive Bayes and Decision Trees. Of course each of
them is able to solve a given class of problems better than other ones. The following section
gives an introduction of SVMs, in order to clarify why they have been used in this thesis
for addressing the problem of fault location.
4.2.1 Support Vector Machines
SVM classiﬁers have been mainly introduced to the aim of solving binary problems, where
the class label can take only two diﬀerent values, and which can be solved by discriminating
the decision boundary between the two classes. However, real world problems often require
to take more complex decisions, i.e., to discriminate among more than two classes, hence
the approach has been extended for handling multi-class problems. Multi Class SVMs
(MCSVMs), can be achieved in two ways: (i) by combining several standard, one-class,
SVM classiﬁers (as it is proposed in [91]), and (ii) by formulating a single optimization
criteria for the whole set of available data. The basic idea underlying the SVM classiﬁcation
is to ﬁnd the maximum margin hyperplane which provides the maximum margin among
the classes.
Linearly separable problems
Let xi denote the feature vector, and let yi denote its class label (e.g., yi = +1 if xi
corresponds to class A, yi = −1 if xi corresponds to class B). In a linear SVM, a linear
decision function is determined by a unit vector w and an oﬀset b as:
f(x) = sgn( wTx− b); (4.1)
such that after projecting a data point, x, onto w, a positive labeled data will have an
output +1 while a negative labeled data will have an output −1. The decision function,
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Figure 4.2: SVM representation for linearly separable problems
f(•), is estimated by maximizing γ, subject to the following constraints:
wT xi − b ≥ γ if yi = +1 (4.2)
wT xi − b ≤ −γ if yi = −1 (4.3)
‖w‖ = 1 (4.4)
where γ is the classiﬁcation margin (dotted line in Figure 4.2). The margin is the minimum
distance from a training vector to the decision boundary. The problem consists into ﬁnding
the w and b that maximize the margin (while maintaining linear separability). Constraints
in 4.2 force all of the data to be outside the margin region, and w to be a unit vector.
Non-linearly separable problems
In the case where the data cannot be separated linearly (Figure 4.3), the optimization
problem is adjusted to tolerate some classiﬁcation errors by means of slack variables, named
ψi. These refer to each data point xi to indicate its violation from a linear separation. The
formulation of constraints becomes:
wT xi − b ≥ γ − ψi if yi = +1 (4.5)
wT xi − b ≤ −γ + ψi if yi = −1 (4.6)
‖w‖ = 1 if ψi ≥ 0 (4.7)
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Figure 4.3: SVM representation of non linearly separable problems
Figure 4.4: Projection of input data in a transformed domain Ω
The overall classiﬁcation error is given by the sum of the slack variables. The objective
function is changed to reﬂect the compromise between minimizing the classiﬁcation error
and maximizing the classiﬁcation margin as:
max : γ − C
N∑
i
ψi (4.8)
where C > 0 is the penalty on classiﬁcation errors. For non-linearly separable problems,
linear SVM can also be run once the original data have been projected into a certain higher
dimensional Euclidean space, Ω, by means of a kernel function (K(x)). The basic idea
is to map data to high dimensional space where it is easier to classify them with linear
decision surfaces: the problem is reformulated so that data is mapped implicitly to this
space. In this case, the problem consists into ﬁnding the non linear K(x) function in charge
of mapping data into Ω (Figure 4.4). Solving the problem without explicitly mapping the
data is desirable, i.e., a K(x) function can be ﬁnd that does not need to be explicated. This
is known as kernel trick. As for example, one could take the inner product of projected
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vectors so that K(xi · xj) = K(xi) ·K(xj), i.e., the image of the inner product of the data
is the inner product of the images of the data. Then, data would have not to be explicitly
map into the high-dimensional space to solve the optimization problem. Further details
about how to classify the projected data can be found in [92].
SVM for multiclass problems
SVMs were originally developed to solve binary classiﬁcation problems. However, the most
of real world problems often require the discrimination between more than two classes. The
most popular proposed approaches to solve a k − class problem are:
1. Using k one-to-rest classiﬁers. This has been demonstrated to be suitable for practical
use and consists in constructing and combining k standard SVM classiﬁers [93];
2. Using k(k-1)/2 pairwise classiﬁers basing on voting (majority, pairwise coupling);
3. Extending the formulation of SVM to support the k − class problem;
4. Considering all classes at once and then construct the decision function;
5. Construct a decision function for each class by only considering the training data
points belonging to that particular class.
A thorough description of all these methods would be out of the scope of this work. The
interested reader can refer to [93]. A variant of the SVM multi-class classiﬁer has been
used in this thesis, named Multiclass Probability SVM (MPSVM). It is a generalization to
the multi-class problem of the Probabilistic SVM classiﬁer (PSVM) proposed by Platt et
al. in [94]. The basic idea behind PSVM is to provide calibrated posterior probabilities,
informally P (class|input) to enable post-processing, along with the classiﬁcation output.
Standard SVMs do not provide such probabilities. Authors proposed to train an SVM, and
then to train the parameters of an additional sigmoid function to map the SVM outputs
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into probabilities. In formulas, being xi the training samples and yi = {+1,−1} the labels:
Pr(y = 1|x) ≈ PA,B(f) ≡
1
1 + exp(Af +B)
where f = f(x) (4.9)
Equation 4.9 refers to the binary case. The best parameter setting for A,B is determined
by solving a regularized maximum likelihood problem. According to [94], a posteriori prob-
abilities are particularly helpful when the classiﬁer is a part of a more complex classiﬁer, or
it has to contribute to an overall decision. Since this is quite close to the situation addressed
in this thesis, a MPSVM classiﬁcation scheme has been adopted. Basically, k standard SVM
classiﬁers are combined and single a posteriori probabilities are computed by means of the
Platt’s method (see [94]).
A posteriori probabilities have been interpreted as a degree of conﬁdence into the performed
classiﬁcation.
4.2.2 Features for location
In order to train the SVM classiﬁer in charge of performing the location, features have been
gathered by several information sources, and at diﬀerent levels. Basically, middleware and
application log ﬁles have been processed, as well as OS logs and conﬁguration ﬁles.
4.2.2.1 Middleware and application features
In particular, text strings have been extracted with respect to all the executable ﬁles in
charge of producing logs, as well as with respect to dynamic libraries (e.g. CORBA ORB
libraries). Extraction has been performed manually, in a conservative way: all the strings
which were likely to be related to error conditions have been included into the feature set
(examples of such strings are reported in the leftmost table of Figure 4.5). Then, features
have been selected by removing most irrelevant and redundant features from the data,
mainly for the sake of dimensionality. This is for enhancing generalization capabilities, as
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well as for speeding up the learning process. Feature selection has been performed in three
steps:
1. Concatenation of all the strings related to a given log (executable ﬁles and libraries);
2. Lowercase transformation;
3. Tokenizing, i.e., only a single copy of each token has been considered. This allowed
to reduce the number of terms signiﬁcantly.
The collection of all the achieved token is called dictionary. Figure 4.5 shows the process of
string tokenizing, i.e., a fragment of the dictionary. Strings refer to the logs generated by
the case study application which will be described in the next chapter thoroughly. Beyond
Figure 4.5: From the collected strings to the dictionary
log ﬁles, conﬁguration ﬁles have been also leveraged as a source of information, and they
have been processed in the same way. They reported the name of the host, its IP address,
and port numbers used by the running application.
4.2.2.2 Detection Features
Along with logs, also detection alarms have been coded into features in order to trigger the
location phase, and to let the location classiﬁer exploit the detection insights. In particular,
detection parameters described in section 3.5.1 have been translated in a vector of real
elements (which in fact are the features) in order to be exploited by the location classiﬁer.
The main goal of these features is to allow the discrimination between false positives and
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actual faults. Features can be both binary (e.g., they represent the occurrence of an event,
like an error of a system call) and real values (e.g., statistics about timeouts within the
system, like tasks schedulation times. A list of the detection features is provided in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Features gathered by OS monitors.
Monitor # of features Description
UNIX system 1141 For each pair (system call, error code), there is a binary feature
calls (it is 1 if the pair occurred, 0 otherwise)
UNIX signals 32 For each signal, there is a binary feature
(it is 1 if the signal occurred, 0 otherwise)
Task schedulation 4 Avg, σ(t), min, max
timeout waiting time for schedulation of DU’s tasks
Waiting time 4 Avg, σ(t), min, max
on semaphores waiting time for a semaphore of DU’s tasks
Holding time 4 Avg, σ(t), min, max
in critical sections holding time for a semaphore of DU’s tasks
Task lifecycle 2 Binary features representing the occurrence of tasks newly
allocated or deallocated, respectively
I/O throughput 1 Binary feature
(it is 1 if the throughput exceeded a bound, 0 otherwise)
Send/receive 2*4*number For each node in the system, Avg, σ, min, max
timeout on a socket of nodes time since last packet sent over sockets
to that node, both in input and in output
Avg=mean time; σ(t)=standard deviation; min/max=minimum/maximum time value
4.2.2.3 Features extraction from logs
When a detection alarm is triggered, log ﬁles have been processed in two ways: if times-
tamps were available on the log, the events occurred within the last 3 seconds have been
processed; otherwise the last 5 lines of the log have been extracted. These values have been
chosen basing on a manual observation of the logs.F
Anyway, the presence of a given token is checked for each extracted entry. If the token is
present in the dictionary, the feature value is set to 1, while it is set to 0 if the token is
not present. More precisely, it is checked whether a token is in the dictionary or not. For
computational eﬃciency purposes, a hash table has been used to store the dictionary. To
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conclude, the feature vector is extracted by merging all the vectors extracted from single
log ﬁles.
4.2.3 Technical Issues
SVM classiﬁer
As for implementation, an open source C library has been used, named libsvm2. It provides
command-line tools to perform training phase (svmtrain) and classiﬁcation (svm-predict).
Several steps have to be made to properly setup these tools: (i) data conversion in a
given format, (ii) data normalization (optional), (iii) SVM classiﬁer selection (OCSVM,
MSVM....), (iv) kernel function selection (radial basis function, sigmoidal...), (v) parameter
setting, depending on the selected classiﬁer and kernel function. As for data format, target
class (i.e., the fault class used to train the classiﬁer) and features have to be listed. Features
and values have to be separated by a semicolon (< featurei : value >), and they have to
be listed in ascending order. The Radial Basis kernel Function (RBF) has been used in this
thesis.
Data management and collection
Data have been collected by the logs by means of Perl scripts. In particular the following
functionalities have been developed:
1. Extraction of the log entries related to the alarm (i.e., the last ﬁve entries of those
related to the last three seconds);
2. Token extraction from log entries;
3. Token search into the dictionary;
2Available at www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/~cjlin/libsvm/
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In order to compute the global detection output, a centralized script has been used in charge
of merging the responses of all the alarm generators. Hence, it has been also necessary to
implement the following functionalities:
1. Feature vectors transmission to the global detector script by means of a pre-allocated
TCP socket;
2. Feature vectors collection;
3. Notiﬁcation of the “generated alarm” event: all the monitors receive a notiﬁcation by
the detector who generated the alarm in order to let them sending their own responses
to the global detector.
I’m not a genius. I’m just a
tremendous bundle of experience.
Richard Buckminster Fuller quotes (US
engineer and architect, 1895-1983 )
Chapter 5
Experimental Results
This chapter illustrates the conducted experiments and the achieved results. A real world middle-
ware for the development of ATC applications has been used as case study. Experiments show that
the implemented diagnosis engine is able to diagnose software faults with good quality and at a low
overhead. Additionally, the aim of reducing detection false positives over time has been accomplished
completely.
5.1 A real world case study
The proposed framework has been evaluated on a real world case study, gathered by the Air Traﬃc
Control (ATC) domain. The application has been developed in the framework of an industrial
partnership1 with Finmeccanica group2 i.e., the leading Italian Company in the ﬁeld of mission and
mission and safety critical systems.
The application which has been used as the case study, is a real world application developed to
work over an open source middleware platform, named CARDAMOM3 [95]. This is a middleware
1COSMIC project, http://www.cosmiclab.it
2http://www.finmeccanica.com
3http://cardamom.objectweb.org
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for the development of safety critical applications, jointly developed by SELEX-SI4, a Finmeccanica
company, and Thales5. These are the two European leaders in the ﬁeld of ATC, and CARDAMOM
is going to be released, its ﬁnal version, by the end of 2012; it will be installed in the main European
airports for air traﬃc management.
CARDAMOM is a DOM (Distributed Object Model) middleware, based on CORBA and it results
from the integration of several OTS items, from libraries to XML parsers, as it is shown in Figure 5.1.
It is wrth o note that. CARDAMOM is based on ACE+TAO, i.e., the open source CORBA orb
developed by the Vanderbilt University 6, which has been widely used both for academical and
industrial research purposes. The presence of third-part modules has been the main reason for
which CARDAMOM has been chosen as a case study in the context of this thesis: in fact, it is a
real world platform allowing to actually evaluate the impact of OTS items on the overall system
dependability, and on the quality of the diagnosis as well. As it is intended for safety critical
scenarios, CARDAMOM is able to provide fault tolerance facilities which are compliant with the
standard OMG FT CORBA speciﬁcations [96]. Further details about the CARDAMOM middleware
can be found in Appendix A. The application is part of a complex distributed system, in charge of
managing ﬂights’ data from the taking oﬀ till to the landing phase. Its main goal is to process Flight
Data Plans (FPDs), i.e., data coming from Radar Tracks which have to be updated in order to control
aircrafts all ﬂight long. The application is also in charge of distributing FDPs to ﬂight controllers,
once they have been processed. An overall architectural view of the case study application, is given
by the component diagram depicted in Figure 5.2. It encompasses three main components:
• Facade, i.e., the interface between the clients (e.g., the Control Working Position, CWP in the
ATC jargon, i.e., the ﬂight controller console) and the rest of the system (conforming to the
Facade GoF design pattern); it provides a remote object API for the atomic addition, removal,
and update of FDPs. The Facade is replicated according to the warm-passive replication
schema. It stores the FDPs along with a lock table for FDPs access serialization;
• Processing Server : it is in charge of processing FDPs on demand. It gathers information from
the Correlation Component and the FDPs published on the internal DDS. This component
is replicated on three nodes, and FDP operations are balanced among servers following a
4http://www.selex-si.com
5http://www.thales.com
6http://www.theaceorb.com
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Figure 5.2: Case study architecture.
round-robin policy.
• Correlation component, which collects ﬂight tracks generated by radars, and associates them
to FDPs, by means of Correlation Manager (CORLM in the ﬁgure 5.2).
The application workload is in charge of forwarding to the Facade the requests coming from the
clients; they ask for both ﬂight tracks and FDP updates. To give signiﬁcance to the workload,
requests are made in a random way and at a given average rate.
5.2 Experimental campaign
5.2.1 Objectives
The experimental campaign aimed to accomplish the following objectives:
1. Demonstrate that the detection approach is able to exploit several low-overhead monitors, by
keeping low the false positive rate and the detection latency.
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2. Demonstrate that the location and recovery modules are able to locate the root cause of a
known fault, and to perform the best recovery action respectively. This has to be performed
on-line, i.e., during system execution, and by exploiting the detection output.
3. Demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of the feedback actions aimed to improve the detection quality
over time.
4. Demonstrate the DLR capability of capturing unknown events, thus avoiding faults to go
unnoticed. This is in order to trigger oﬀ-line maintenance (e.g., by alerting human operators)
once the system has been put in a safe state by means of the “most severe” recovery action,
e.g., a system reboot.
5.3 Evaluation metrics
Detection
As stated in chapter 3, the following quality metrics have been used to evaluate detection approaches
(according to [86]):
• Coverage, i.e., the conditional probability that, if a fault occurred, it will detected. It is
estimated by the ratio between the number of detected faults and the number of injected
faults.
• False positive rate, which is in fact an accuracy metric, i.e., the conditional probability that an
alarm is triggered, given that no actual faults occurred. It is estimated by the ratio between
the number of false alarms and the number of normal events monitored.
• Latency, i.e., the time between the execution of the fault-injected code, and the time of
detection; it is an upper bound for the time between fault activation and the time of detection.
• Overhead, which have been estimated by measuring the execution time of remote methods
implemented in the Facade remote object; in particular, the execution time for the less and
the most costly methods have been evaluated, in terms of execution time (respectively, up-
date callback, and request return).
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Location
According to [97, 62], the following metrics have been used to evaluate the location engine:
• Accuracy, i.e., the percentage of faults which are classiﬁed correctly, with respect to all the
activated faults. Letting A and B be two classes of faults, it can be expressed as:
A =
TPA + TPB
TPA + FPA + TPB + FPB
(5.1)
• Precision, i.e., the conditional probability that, if a fault is classiﬁed as belonging to class A,
the decision is correct. This metric refers a single class (e.g., A), hence it can be expressed as:
P =
TPA
TPA + FPA
(5.2)
• Recall, i.e., the conditional probability that, if a fault belongs to class A, the classiﬁers decides
for A. This metric refers a single class too, hence it can be expressed as:
R =
TPA
TPA + FNA
(5.3)
In equations 5.2 and 5.3, the quantities TPA, FPA and FNA represent, respectively, the number
of True Positives (i.e., the samples of A are classiﬁed as belonging to A), False Positives (i.e., the
samples not of A are classiﬁed as A), and False Negatives (i.e., the samples of A are not classiﬁed
as A).
5.4 Faultload
The faultload, i.e., the set of faults to inject into application source code, has been designed basing
on the ﬁeld data study conducted by Madeira et al. [1]. Here, additional classes of software faults
are encompassed which extend the ODC classiﬁcation (see section 1.2.4).
In particular, SM has been used to inject faults into the Facade and into the Processing Servers
processes. This has been done by means of the most common fault operators; injected faults are
summarized in Table 5.1. Table 5.3 gives more detailed examples of injected faults. The injected
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Figure 5.3: Examples of faults actually injected into the facade.
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Table 5.1: Source-code faults injected in the case study application.
ODC DEFECT FAULT NATURE FAULT TYPE #
Assignment (63.89%)
MISSING
MVIV - Missing Variable Initial. using a Value 8
MVAV - Missing Variable Assign. using a Value 5
MVAE - Missing Variable Assign. using a Value 5
WRONG MVAV - Wrong Value Assigned to Variable 26
EXTRANEOUS EVAV - Extraneous Variable Assignment using another Variable 2
Checking (6.94%)
MISSING MIA - Missing IF construct Around statement 2
WRONG WLEC - Wrong logical expr. used as branch condition 3
Interface (4.17%)
MISSING MLPA - Missing small and Localized Part of the Algorithm 2
WRONG WPFV - Wrong variable used in Parameter of Function Call 1
Algorithm (20.83%) MISSING
MFC - Missing Function Call 13
MIEB - Missing If construct plus statement plus Else... 1
MIFS - Missing IF construct plus Statement 1
Function (4.17%)
MISSING MFCT - Missing Functionality 2
WRONG WALL - Wrong Algorithm (Large modiﬁcations) 1
Total 72
faults listed in Table 5.1 are representative of the most common mistakes made by developers. In
the ODC perspective, faults are characterized by the change in the code by which they can be ﬁxed.
Faults operators in [1] describe the rules to locate representative fault locations within source code.
The most common way for selecting the components where faults have to be injected, is to take into
account software complexity metrics: the more complex the software, the higher the probability of
residual faults [98]. By analyzing the application source code, it has been argued that the Facade
and Processing Server remote objects (C++ classes) have the major complexity in terms of Lines Of
Code (LOCs) and cyclomatic complexity. For this reason, faults have been injected in these classes
accounting for a total number of 72 (56 for the Facede and 16 for the Processing Server classes).
In practice, injection has been realized by means of conditional compiling directives; a fragment
of the code implementing injection is shown in Figure 5.4. This way, faults have injected one per
program execution and they are never activated simultaneously. This means that the simultaneous
occurrence of more than one fault is not encompassed in this experimental campaign. The fault
set has been divided into two subsets of the same size; samples to each subset have been assigned
randomly. The former subset, named training set, has been used to train and setup the detection
and location modules; the latter, also called testset, has been used to test the eﬀectiveness of the
two phases, and of the overall DLR framework as well.
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Figure 5.4: SM . Faults have been injected into the code via conditional compiling
The testbed
Experiments have been run on the 128 nodes computer cluster provided by the Laboratorio CINI-
ITEM “Carlo Savy”, where the entire research work described in this thesis has been conducted. The
case study application has been deployed on 9 nodes (two Facade replicas, one for the CARDAMOM
Fault tolerance service, one for Load Balancing Service, three for the FDP processing servers, and 2
nodes are allocated to the Client and to CORLM component, respectively) wired by Gigabit LAN.
For the sake of results reliability, and to exclude biasing due to hardware errors, the cluster has
been partitioned in 10 LANs: experiments have been executed on the 10 partitions, simultaneously.
Global results have been achieved by ﬁltering and averaging the results obtained on each single
network.
Nodes hardware equipment consisted of 2 Xeon Hyper-Threaded 2.8GHz CPUs, 3.6GB of physical
memory, and a Gigabit Ethernet interface; nodes are interconnected through a 56 Gbps network
switch.
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5.5 Experiments and results
This section provides details about the processed log ﬁles, the selected features, and the fault classes.
Error messages have been extracted by processing both binary ﬁles and libraries of the application,
as well as of the OTS libraries (e.g., CARDAMOM, TAO). The strings UNIX utility has been used
to this aim. The number of collected error messages has been signiﬁcant, more than 7000, as well as
the number of keywords included into the dictionary, which was about 6000. As for features, they
account for a total of 17171, taking into account all the running DUs. Details are summarized in
Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Diagnosis features details
Number of logs ﬁle types 8
Number of monitored log ﬁles 16
Number of OTS libraries 87
Number of log 7691
messages
Number of extracted tokens 6043
within log messages
Number of application keywords 33
Monitored processes Facade,
by the OS 3 Servers
Number of OS features (per process) 1250
Total amount of features 17171
Classes have been associated to each fault, once all the injection experiments have been executed
preliminarily. Several failure modes have been observed, i.e., faults surfaced in diﬀerent failures. A
recovery mean (the best one) and a root cause have been associated to each class, as summarized in
Table 5.3.
5.5.1 Detection
The detection system described in chapter 4 has been integrated into the DLR framework to support
the location phase. This section aims to describe results related to the detection with respect to the
application case study, as well as to discuss the eﬀectiveness of the proposed mechanism. First of
all, the performance of individual monitors have been evaluated. This is in order to (i) evaluate the
eﬀectiveness of single monitors and (ii) to quantify the beneﬁts of the global detection approach. For
116
Table 5.3: Fault classes and association with recovery means.
FAULT CLASS TYPE LOCATION RECOVERY
Class 0 No fault None The system is correctly working.
Class 1 Crash Facade Activate the backup replica; a new backup replica is activated.
Class 2 Passive hang Facade Locked resources free and preempted transaction kill.
The success of the recovery depends on application properties
(e.g., the FDP will be correctly updated by the next update operation);
Class 3 Crash Server Reboot the server process, add it to the load balanced group.
Class 4 Passive hang Facade Application reboot. The application might have failed due to transient
(at start time) faults, then the reboot may succeed on the second try.
Human intervention may be required if the reboot does not succeed.
each monitor, a sensitivity analysis has been conducted: parameter’s value of the target monitor have
been let vary within the range [1s, 4s] (see table 3.4). The best values gathered by the sensitivity
analysis, with respect to the Facade and Server DUs respectively, are shown in Table 5.4 and in
Table 5.5. Diﬀerent monitors achieve diﬀerent performances in terms of coverage, since they are
suited for diﬀerent failure modes; actually, monitors are unable to achieve full coverage, except for
the SOCKET monitor. Furthermore, performances vary with respect to the considered DU . As for
example, in the case of the Processing Server, only crashes (class 3 in Table 5.3) have been observed,
hence no faults have been identiﬁed by the monitors devoted to the control of blocking conditions
(e.g., wait for a semaphore). All the monitors experienced the same mean latency as they have been
triggered together right after the abortion of the DU .
The most of the monitors provided a reasonable percentage of false positives. However, there are
some for which the rate of False Positives (FP) has been very high (e.g., the UNIX system call
monitor triggered the 36.08% of false positives over all the triggered alarms). It is crucial to ﬁlter
out false positives in order to allow monitors to be included into the system and to bring beneﬁts
to the overall detection engine. This increases the amount of covered faults, and hence the overall
coverage, and it allows to better support the location phase.
Results shown in Table 5.6 are related to the global detection system. The detector is able
to achieve full coverage, i.e., all the injected faults did result in errors which have been detected.
Additionally, the FP rate has been kept low, in that it never exceeds the 7%: in other words, the
global detection accuracy has been increased signiﬁcantly if compared to that of single monitors.
The achieved values are comparable to the best ones experienced by single monitors, for both the
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Table 5.4: Coverage, FP rate, and latency provided by the monitors. (Facade DU)
Monitor Parameter value Coverage FP rate Mean Latency (ms.)
UNIX semaphores hold timeout 4 s 64.5% 36.08% 1965.65
UNIX semaphores wait timeout 2 s 67.7% 1.7% 521.18
Pthread mutexes hold timeout 4 s 64.5% 4.01% 469.51
Pthread mutexes wait timeout - 0% 0% -
Schedulation threshold 4 s 74.1% 3.25% 1912.22
Syscall error codes 1 s 45.1% 0.6% 768.97
Process exit 1 s 45.1% 0% 830.64
Signals 1 s 45.1% 0% 816.57
Task lifecycle 1 s 35.4% 0.05% 375.7
I/O throughput 3 s 77.3% 0.4% 4476.67
network input
I/O throughput 3 s 77.3% 0.2% 2986.4
network output
I/O throughput 3 s 70.9% 0.4% 4930
disk reads
I/O throughput 2 s 67.6% 0.05% 6168.57
disk writes
Sockets 4 s 100% 3.47% 469.58
monitored DUs. To have a gross grain estimate of the beneﬁts, the average FP rate of the monitors
has been calculated: if the global detection algorithm would have not been used, they would have
exibithed a FP rate equal to 6,87% and 18.23% for the Facade and the Processing Server DUs
respectively. Hence, with respect to results in Table 5.6, FP rate has been lowered of the 1,02% and
of the 12,37% for the two monitored DUs.
Last, but equally relevant, better results have been achieved with respect to the latency too.
Overhead
In order to estimate the overhead of the detection system, i.e., how much it interferes with the
workload execution, the execution times of the two most frequently invoked methods (i.e., FDP
update and request callbacks) have been measured. This has been done by letting the client requests
rate vary. First, the execution times have been measured when the detector was not running. Then,
these have been compared with the execution times experienced when the detector was activated.
As it is shown in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 the overhead never exceeded the 10%, even in the worst
case , i.e., during the most intensive workload periods.
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Table 5.5: Coverage, FP rate, and latency provided by the monitors. (Server DU)
Monitor Parameter value Coverage FP rate Mean Latency (ms.)
UNIX semaphores hold timeout 2 s 0% 3.61% -
UNIX semaphores wait timeout 2 s 0% 2.28% -
Pthread mutex hold timeout 2 s 0% 4.44% -
Pthread mutex wait timeout - 0% 0% -
Schedulation threshold 1 s 0% 3.25% -
Syscall error codes 1 s 100% 0.98% 522.5
Process exit 1 s 100% 0.005% 522.5
Signals 1 s 100% 0.005% 522.5
Task lifecycle 1 s 100% 0.22% 522.5
I/O throughput 3 s 100% 0.49% 522.5
network input
I/O throughput 3 s 100% 87.35% 522.5
network output
I/O throughput 3 s 100% 79.31% 522.5
disk reads
I/O throughput 3 s 100% 77.77% 522.5
disk writes
Sockets 2 s 100% 3.14% 522.5
Table 5.6: Coverage, accuracy, and latency experienced by the global detection system.
Facade Server
Coverage 100% 100%
False positive rate 4.85% 6.86%
Mean Latency 100.26 ± 135.76 ms 165.67 ± 122.43 ms
5.5.2 Location
Location has been evaluated with respect to both known and unknown faults. The former correspond
to faults which have been submitted to the diagnosis engine during the training phase. With respect
to them, classiﬁcation capabilities have been evaluated. The latter, instead, correspond to faults
which were never submitted to the engine before. In fact, they are faults which resulted in unexpected
failures. In particular, the faults labeled as belonging to “Class 4” have been counted out during
the training phase. First, location performances have been evaluated with respect to the remaining
classes (from Class 0 to Class 3), with a low conﬁdence level (C = 0.9). In this case, the location
classiﬁer has been always able to classify the fault correctly. Furthermore, it has been able to catch
all the false positives coming from the detection system, as shown in Table 5.7. The Table refers to
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the case where samples of all the classes have been included into the training set. Then, “Class 4”
entries have been submitted to the location classiﬁer. Achieved results are summarized in Table 5.8.
As it can be argued by the above results, coverage is far from meeting the requirements of a critical
system, at least when the conﬁdence level is C = 0.9. In this case, known faults have been classiﬁed
correctly but, despite of this, only the 5% of the unknown faults have been catched correctly. This
means that the most of them have been misclassiﬁed, or even worse, they went unnoticed.
In order to understand the reason for so poor results, the impact of conﬁdence level, which was
likely to be low for pinpointing unknown entries, has been further investigated . Results of such a
sensitivity analysis are reported in Table 5.8.
Note that the higher the conﬁdence level, the lower the coverage with respect to known faults (i.e.,
the number of the known faults which is classiﬁed correctly, decreases). Hence, a trade oﬀ has to
be looked for when tuning the engine. For the application case study, conﬁdence levels equal to
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Table 5.7: Location accuracy wrt to the conﬁdence level
Conﬁdence Accuracy
0.9 100%
0.99 94.29%
0.995 94.29%
0.999 71.43%
0.9999 25.71%
Table 5.8: Location performances in the presence of unknown faults (class 4)
Conﬁdence ACCURACY P(KNOWN) R(KNOWN) P(UNKNOWN) R(UNKNOWN)
0.9 60% 59.09% 100% 100% 5.26%
0.99 75.56% 70.27% 100% 100% 42.11%
0.995 77.78% 73.52% 96.15% 90.91% 52.63%
0.999 75.56% 80% 76.92% 70% 73.68%
0.9999 42.22% n.a. 0% 42.22% 100%
C = 0.99 and C = 0.995 allow to classify known fault correctly, and to identify a high number of
unknown faults as well (42.11% and 52.63% respectively). Hence, the objective of the tuning phase
is to keep the recall as much as possible next to 1, with respect to the unknown faults.
The location of a faults encompasses two temporal contributions. The former is the time required
for collecting data by the detection system, once an alarm has been triggered. The latter is the time
required for performing actual classiﬁcation and location of the fault. Table 5.9 shows the results
which have been achieved with respect to the conducted experimental campaign. It is shown that the
overall location takes less than 1.2s. on average. This can be interpreted only with respect to system
requirements. For a safety critical system, it could be a good results. For hard real time systems, as
for example, it could be an unacceptably long time. However, the presence of OTS items contributes
to make the location, and diagnosis process as well, longer than one could expect. Better results
would have been achieved for more specialized and bespoke, ad-hoc, systems. The last signiﬁcant
Table 5.9: Location times
Mean time for data collection 84.4 ± 115.11 ms
Mean time for location 917.14 ± 23.63 ms
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result which is worth discussing, concerns the actual capability of the location phase to improve the
detection quality over time. In order to demonstrate this point, the false positive rate exhibited by
the detection system has been monitored during all the experiments. As it is shown in Figure 5.7,
a signiﬁcant amount of false positives has been experienced at the beginning of workload execution.
In fact, up to about 250 false alarms have been triggered during the ﬁrst hour of execution. Then,
the retraining action performed by the location phase pursued its aim: the number of false positives
dramatically decreased, till being equal to zero.
Figure 5.7: Cumulative number of false positives over time.
Conclusions
This dissertation addressed the problem of software faults diagnosis in complex, OTS based,
critical systems. The problem has not been solved so far, mainly due to the presence of
software faults which can manifest transiently thus making quite diﬃcult to reproduce the
conditions for their activation, which depend on environmental factors. These faults, which
become even more tricky to face in the presence of OTS items, advocate the need for a
recovery oriented diagnosis approach which is the key for achieving fault tolerance.
This dissertation proposed a holistic approach which encompasses the phases of detection,
location, and recovery. This represents a novel contribution, in that these phases have
never been integrated before to perform fault diagnosis in OTS based e legacy systems.
First, detection has almost always been considered as a separate task, and its impact on the
diagnosis of faults has been underestimated. Second, recovery has been performed manually,
rather than automatically, thus requiring human involvement and long downtimes in many
cases.
The proposed framework has been named DLR to explicitly recall the phases of Detection,
Location and Recovery. An engine implementing this framework has been developed which
has been evaluated on a real world safety critical system, intended for the development
of Air Traﬃc Control applications. The system has been implemented to run in Linux
environment, although the proposed approach, as well as the designed architecture, are
general enough to be used in several scenarios and on diﬀerent systems.
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The most signiﬁcant research contributions brought by this thesis are:
• The intuition that detection has to be integrated into the diagnosis process to en-
compass transient software faults. This is novel in that this has been stated in [60]
theoretically but no actual implementations of such an integration have been made so
far;
• The exploitation of OS support to detect application failures. This is novel in that the
most common detection techniques are direct, i.e., they observe the system directly
by means of logs produced by the monitored entities, or by monitors implemented
within the controlled system.
• The ability of detecting, and then repairing, even a subset of faults which is “un-
known”, i.e., faults which never occurred before. This is a novel contribution in that
all the previous approaches did not encompass the presence of these faults (which are
in fact the cause of ﬁeld failures) i.e., they assumed the fault model to be completely
known at design time. Run time falls, in fact, were ignored completely, thus they
were likely to result in false negatives. Obviously, this is not acceptable in safety and
mission critical scenarios.
To corroborate these intuitions, the thesis demonstrated that:
1. sometimes built-in middleware detection mechanisms are unable to detect hang fail-
ures by their own (section 3.6);
2. the most of application hang failures can be detected by means of OS level detectors
(section 3.4.5).
The self-detection capabilities of the Linux kernel have been investigated in order to quan-
tify their trustworthiness. Some deﬁciencies emerged when detecting kernel hangs, hence a
detection algorithm has been implemented to support kernel hang detection (coverage has
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been improved of 25%). Then, a complex detection architecture has been designed to detect
(i) application hangs and (ii), to detect application failures in a location oriented perspec-
tive. The architecture is modular, and it is based on several monitors whose responses are
combined to provide a global detection output. In both the cases, the kernel hang detection
algorithm has been used as one of the monitors. Results demonstrated the eﬀectiveness of
the proposed detection approach, which has been achieved at a low overhead (less than the
5% in all the experimental setups). Overall, the results demonstrated that:
1. The detection approach is able to exploit several low-overhead and inaccurate monitors
at the OS level, by keeping low the false positive rate and the detection latency as
well;
2. The proposed location and recovery strategies are able to correctly locate the root
cause of a known fault within the system, and to trigger the proper recovery action in
an on-line manner. Known faults have been covered completely, with both a precision
and recall equal to 1 (section 5.5.2)
3. The implemented DLR framework is able to partially discover unknown faults within
the system. This is useful to trigger oﬀ-line maintenance (e.g., by alerting a human
operator). In particular, the DLR engine has been able to detect up to the xx% of
unknown injected faults, without compromising the detection of known faults, which
have been detected with a 100% coverage.
4. The machine learning approach has been helpful for reducing the number of false pos-
itives triggered by the detection over time, by means of the feedback actions triggered
by the location module (section 5.5.2).
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Appendix A
CARDAMOM
CARDAMOM is a middleware platform enabling component based software architecture
for the implementation of safety and mission critical systems, such as those for air traﬃc
control and combat management systems. It has been jointly developed by SELEX-SI and
THALES, i.e., the two European leaders in these ﬁelds.
CARDAMOM provides a framework for the integration of both Business Components of the
functional architecture and Technical Components of non-functional architecture. Compo-
nents are either proprietary components or COTS (Commercial Oﬀ The Shelf) components.
CARDAMOM is based on the main interoperability standards, deﬁned by the Object Man-
agement Group (OMG) organization:
• UML (OMG standard) and XML (W3C standard) at business level;
• CCM OMG standard in order to separate the business logic from the technical services;
• CORBA OMG standard at technical level.
The major principles on which it relies on are:
• CARDAMOM is multi-domain, as it is intended to be used by diﬀerent Units in
several domains such as Air Traﬃc Control, Naval Combat Management, Electronic
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Warfare, Airborne Command, and Control systems;
• Distribution and promotion of CARDAMOM as an Open Source product, in order
to allow a wide use of the product and thus to ensure its reliability, durability and
long-term support;
• CARDAMOM is CORBA-based. CORBA has been selected as it is a non-proprietary
middleware standardized by the OMG and it actually supports heterogeneity across
hardware platforms and programming languages, thus is suitable to integrate smoothly
legacy systems. CARDAMOM also supports the CORBA Component Model (CCM)
which allows to make a clear separation between the functional properties (application
logic) and the non-functional properties (technical services).
• Support of the CORBA Fault Tolerance, as well as the provision of mechanisms allow-
ing to develop fault-tolerant applications as well as a fault-tolerant middleware plat-
form (with no single point of failure). CARDAMOM provides the WARM-Passive
replication style, and the appropriate fault-tolerance mechanisms allowing manag-
ing transparently failure detection, request retry and redirection. In terms of con-
sistency, it provides the State Transfer Framework (DataStore API) facility which
assures strong replica consistency.
A.1 CARDAMOM Services
As shown in Figure A.1, CARDAMOM provides two classes of services: basic and pluggable.
The former are mandatory and thus are always included in a user application. Other
CARDAMOM services rely on them services to pursue their mission.The latter, instead, are
optional hence a user application can use only the services it needs as they are independent
one on the other.
Services can be implemented as separate processes (i.e. that do not include application
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Figure A.1: Services provided by CARDAMOM
software) or as libraries. In the ﬁrst case, their are selected at system level: depending
on whether a service is needed or not, a CARDAMOM-based system will include or not
the corresponding process(es). In the second case, service selection is performed on a per
process basis: every process can choose the subset of services it wants to use. The most
used services are listed and described shortly in the following.
• System Management. This service supports the system technical supervision allowing
to handle and monitor the elements (systems, nodes, application, processes, compo-
nents, group of fault tolerant or load balanced items) making up a system. It covers
the initial deﬁnition of the system conﬁguration as well as its modiﬁcation during
system operation. Additionally it is responsible for the control of system elements
(initialization, start, stop, switch-over, initialization order and the termination or-
der of application software), and of user-deﬁned objects lifecycle. It is in charge of
performing system monitoring, including the detection of faulty elements and the mon-
itoring of node resources (CPU load, memory occupation). System reconﬁguration to
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cope with faults and thus to ensure the continuity of system operation despite failures
is also responsibility of this service. Finally, it provides notiﬁcation to subscribers
(application software, administration tools) about status and conﬁguration changes
of managed elements, including ﬁltering capabilities in order to reduce the amount
of information exchanged. System Management modules that could have been single
points of failures are replicated.
• Life Cycle service, which provides a framework for creating and deleting CORBA
objects and managing servants life cycle through pre-deﬁned strategies; it is accessible
through an interface providing location and access transparency. It allows to use the
POA easily, allowing the selection of POA advanced features.
• Repository service, which provides a scalable object repository to store and retrieve
object references and attributes. This service provides CORBA Naming and Prop-
erty Services compatible interfaces and an access independent from programming lan-
guages.
• Event service, which supports asynchronous communication (using push model and
generic event channel) and provides add-on software encapsulation ORB implemen-
tation speciﬁc features such as event channel creation and that eases connection to
event channels.
• Data Distribution, which supports the creation and the synchronization of replicated
data pools stored on the local memories of diﬀerent hosts. Based on a Publish-
Subscribe model, it allows the asynchronous updates to the local data pools and
the possibility of ﬁnding the current state of the data pool when connecting for the
ﬁrst time, or when reconnecting after an absence. It complies with the OMG Data
Distribution Service (DDS).
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• Time Management, which provides (i) multiple views of time based on clock char-
acteristics such as resolution, precision, time scale and (ii), timed execution of an
operation after a user-speciﬁed delay. IT complies with the OMG “Enhanced View of
Time” service.
• Load balancing, which is responsible to dynamically dispatch client requests across
available servers, in order to optimize response times and resource usage according
to several policies. The Load Balancing infrastructure is replicated so as not to be a
single point of failure.
• Traces and Performance service allowing the run-time analysis of middleware platform
as well as application software, by providing traces that can be enabled, disabled, or
ﬁltered at runtime and stored on disk. It includes several selection criteria that can
be set at runtime so as to provide only information in which users are interested.
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